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Perinteinen rahapolitiikka nojautuu vahvasti korkokanavan toimivuuteen, jossa keskuspankin 
politiikkakoron muutosten odotetaan välittyvän rahamarkkinakorkoihin ja edelleen pankkien 
asiakkaille annettujen luottojen korkoihin, jotka viime kädessä vaikuttavat kokonaiskysyntään 
ja hintatasoon. Vahva ja välitön korkojen välittyminen on erityisen tärkeää 
inflaatiotavoitteeseen tähtääville keskuspankeille, sillä inflaatiotavoitteeseen pääseminen 
tapahtuu perinteisesti talouden korkotasoa säätelemällä. 
 
Vuonna 2007 alkaneen finanssikriisin jälkeen rahamarkkinat sekä Yhdysvalloissa että 
Euroopassa ajautuivat ongelmiin. Kasvaneesta vastapuoli- ja likviditeettiriskistä johtuen 
pankit eivät enää olleet halukkaita lainaamaan likviditeettiä toisilleen, jonka seurauksena 
keskuspankkien politiikkakorot eivät enää välittyneet rahamarkkinakorkoihin. Tästä syystä 
keskuspankit joutuivat turvautumaan epätavallisiin (unconventional) politiikkatoimenpiteisiin 
rahamarkkinoiden tasapainottamiseksi ja korkokanavan toimivuuden palauttamiseksi.  
 
Tässä tutkielmassa keskitytään korkokanavan toimivuuteen tarkastelemalla Euroopan 
keskuspankin (EKP) epätavallisten politiikkatoimenpiteiden vaikuttavuutta rahamarkkinoiden 
tasapainon palauttamisessa. Tutkimusmetodeina käytetään yhteisintegraatiolähestymistapaa ja 
virheenkorjausmallia; empiiristen tulosten mukaan EKP:n epätavallinen rahapolitiikka on 
lokakuun 2008 jälkeen onnistunut pienentämään pankkien välisessä lainanannossa esiintyvää 
riskipreemiota ja näin jossain määrin palauttamaan korkokanavan toimivuutta. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent decades the financial industry has been under significant changes, both in terms of 
its size and structure. Size of financial sector has increased significantly in advanced countries, 
as measured by its percentage of GDP. The explanation for financial sector growth lies largely 
in deregulation of financial markets. Since the 1980s western governments have 
systematically worked towards removing regulation as the prevailing view was that markets 
are efficient in allocating resources and risk, and that they work best when they are not 
interfered with. However, recent crisis has shown that this is not always the case. In fact, it 
can be argued that financial innovation combined with inadequate regulation largely 
contributed to the build-up of systemic risk that realized and led to a global recession in late 
2008. 
 
The financial crisis starting in August 2007 deeply affected particularly the credit market. As 
a result of materializing credit risk from subprime loans initiated in the U.S., market 
participants around the world were affected via two dimensions. Firstly, financial innovation 
had brought new securities to the market such as credit default swaps and collateralized debt 
obligations that were derived from subprime mortgages. Direct losses from holding these 
derivative contracts were largely responsible for tightening credit. Secondly, as the losses 
from these securities were experienced by most market participants, even healthy banks found 
it hard to obtain funding from the market because banks lost confidence in counterparties’ 
ability to repay loans. Lack of confidence arose from a widespread uncertainty concerning the 
risk positions held by counterparty banks. As consequence of increased risk aversion in bank 
lending, interest rates charged for interbank loans skyrocketed. Reduced interbank lending 
spilled over to retail lending, causing companies around the world to experience funding 
difficulties. Suddenly, funding that was needed to secure continuation of their everyday 
business, such as covering payrolls and paying for purchases, was no longer available. This 
had severe real effects as investment and consumption were postponed and assets were sold at  
fire sale prices in order to service obligations that fell due. A spiral of falling asset prices and 
increasing uncertainty was born. 
 
Developments in banking sector activities during recent decades reveal why bank lending 
behavior was severely affected. Traditionally banks have collected short term deposits from 
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the public and acted as maturity transformers by making long term loans. This meant that in 
order to issue loans, banks needed a sufficient amount of deposits to finance the loan. 
However, in the 21
st 
century there has been two important changes in banking activities. 
Firstly, emergence of a shadow banking sector has brought new near-bank entities to the field 
such as securities brokers and dealers, finance companies and asset-backed security issuers. 
Financing model of these entities is completely based on short term market financing as their 
business model is mainly to issue securities that are sold to banks and other institutions. 
Secondly, traditional banks have also become increasingly reliant on wholesale market 
funding as compared to traditional retail deposits. Starting from the 1990s, short term money 
markets have become significant funding sources for banks and near-banks because the 
general view is that they provide a more flexible way to manage asset and liability structures. 
 
In this thesis, special attention is given to the interbank market, which is a subsection of the 
wider money market. In the interbank market, banks lend and borrow funds to one another for 
a specified term. In current fractional reserve banking system, banks are required to hold an 
adequate amount of liquid assets, such as cash, to manage any potential deposit withdrawals 
by clients. If a bank cannot meet these liquidity requirements, it will need to borrow money 
from the market to cover the shortfall. Some banks, on the other hand, may have excess liquid 
assets exceeding liquidity requirements. These banks usually lend the excess money in order 
to avoid the opportunity cost of not receiving interest. As a result, supply and demand for 
money in the interbank market determine the interbank rate, which is the rate for 
uncollateralized loans between banks with maturity ranging from one day to 12 months.  
 
Normally, banks use the interbank market for funding purposes because the banking system 
design provides banks with incentives to allocate funds provided by the central bank between 
each other, rather than using central bank facilities for funding. The design gives the central 
bank direct control of intermediate targets, such as the policy rate. Usually central banks 
determine the short interest rate by supplying such amounts of reserves to banks that the 
policy rate settles to a desired level. However, level of policy rate as such is of restricted 
economic importance. Economic decisions are typically made based on other financial market 
prices, such as long term interest rates, equity prices, and exchange rates, which are linked to 
the policy rate. Therefore, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on whether desired 
changes in the policy rate are transmitted to other financial prices, which ultimately affect 
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consumption, employment and economic growth. In this thesis, particular attention is given to 
the link between the policy rate and longer term interbank rates in the European context. 
 
Interbank rates are important for two main reasons. Firstly, interbank rates represent the 
marginal cost of funding for banks, which in turn determine the cost of short term bank loans 
and deposit rates. Moreover, interbank rates determine the cost of longer term loans made to 
households and firms, thereby affecting financing conditions for households and businesses. 
Secondly, interbank rates serve as a benchmark for pricing fixed income securities, such as 
short term interest rates futures, forward rate agreements and interest rate and currency swaps. 
Therefore, the level of interbank rates, and particularly the central banks’ control over 
interbank rates, is of particular importance in assessing the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Interbank markets are a key factor in transmitting monetary policy decisions to real economy 
particularly via the interest rate channel of monetary policy. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the tensions in the European interbank market and 
evaluate the European central bank’s (ECB) ability to reduce risk premia incorporated in Euro 
Interbank Offered Rates, or EURIBOR rates, during recent financial crisis. The thesis is 
inspired by the credit freeze of 2008 and its adverse effects to monetary transmission and real 
economy. More specifically, special attention is given to interest rate transmission which 
seems to have lost some of its power during recent crisis. An empirical assessment is provided 
in order to evaluate the extent to which the ECB has been able to reduce risk premia in the 
interbank market, and consequently, to restore proper functioning of the interest rate channel 
of monetary policy. 
 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework for monetary 
transmission and explains how interbank rates are determined. Unconventional tools of 
monetary policy are also discussed, as the traditional interest rate channel has met its limits 
during current crisis. Some empirical evidence is also provided on interest rate pass-through 
before the crisis. Chapter 3 studies the risk premium incorporated in EURIBOR rates in more 
detail. Theoretical framework is provided to better understand the sources of risk premium in 
interbank lending. Unconventional measures of the ECB during current crisis are also 
presented as they are relevant in reducing tensions in the interbank market. Chapter 4 provides 
a brief overview of literature studying interbank spreads and empirically evaluates whether 
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the ECB’s unconventional liquidity provision has reduced interbank risk premia in the euro 
area. Chapter 5 provides conclusions and discusses potential disadvantages of unconventional 
monetary policy. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR MONETARY TRANSMISSION AND 
INTERBANK RATES 
 
2.1. Monetary policy transmission channels 
 
One of the pillars of making monetary policy is good understanding of different monetary 
transmission mechanisms that transmit central bank actions to the real economy and allows 
the central bank to steer the economy in the desired direction. This section describes the 
functioning of different channels of monetary policy transmission. The categorization of 
channels is based on Mishkin (1996). A common feature of all the channels is that they all 
transmit policy decisions to aggregate demand or supply through financial markets. 
 
2.1.1. Exchange rate channel 
 
The exchange rate channel refers to the central bank’s ability to manipulate exchange rates. 
To see this, consider an interest rate cut which leads to higher money supply. The interest rate 
cut leads, through the term structure of interest rates, to lower interest paid on deposits 
denominated in domestic currency relative to deposits denominated in foreign currencies.  As 
a consequence, deposits denominated in domestic currency decline relative to foreign 
currency denominated deposits. This leads to a depreciating currency, which makes domestic 
goods cheaper than foreign goods, causing net exports to expand and domestic aggregate 
output to rise. (Mishkin, 1996) Naturally, the exchange rate channel does not exist for 
countries with a fixed exchange rate. Conversely, the more open an economy is in terms of 
trade, the stronger this channel is. 
 
Exchange rate fluctuations may also influence aggregate demand by affecting the balance 
sheets of domestic firms whose balance sheets include a large share of debt denominated in 
foreign currency. If the asset side of the balance sheet is mainly denominated in domestic 
currency, then a depreciating currency raises the debt burden but leaves the asset side of the 
balance sheet unchanged, causing the net worth of the firm decline. 
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At the early stages of financial development, the exchange rate channel is thought to play a 
key role. In countries with undeveloped capital and money markets, foreign exchange is 
perceived as the single most liquid and inflation proof asset. The price of this asset, the 
exchange rate, quickly reacts to changes in monetary policy, which ultimately leads to 
changes in output and prices. (Gigineishvili, 2011) 
 
2.1.2. Asset price channel 
 
The asset price channel refers to the central bank’s ability to raise asset prices, such as stocks 
and real estate. To see this, consider an interest rate decrease by the central bank which causes 
all interest rates to decrease along the term structure. Lower interest rates make bonds less 
attractive as investment than stocks and result in increased demand for stocks, causing stock 
prices to rise. Conversely, interest rate reductions make it cheaper to finance housing, causing 
real estate prices to rise. (Mishkin, 1996) 
 
To see the effect more precisely, consider the following demonstration. Theoretically, stock 
prices are net present values of all expected future cash flows that they provide to the holder. 
Future cash flows are discounted to the present by using some discount rate. In finance, the 
discount rate is usually the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), which includes a 
component describing required return for equity. The required return for equity is usually 
determined by Capital Asset Pricing –model (CAPM), which can be written as: 
 
                          ,     (1) 
 
in which       is the required (or expected) return on the capital asset,    is the risk free rate, 
   is beta of capital asset, and       is expected return on the market portfolio. The term 
             describes the risk premium for the security. Traditionally government bond 
yields have been used as the risk free rate. As described above, an expansionary monetary 
policy lowers yields on all bonds. If the risk premium for the security,               is 
assumed to be constant, then the reduction in the risk free rate lowers the expected return 
      for the security. Since the price of the capital asset is the discounted NPV of all future 
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cash flows, the lower discount rate therefore increases the NPV, or the price of the capital 
asset. 
 
There are three different types of transmission mechanisms that involve asset prices: 
investment effects, wealth effects and balance sheet effects. Investment effects are explained 
by Tobin’s q theory (1969). Tobin’s q is defined as the market value of firms divided by the 
replacement cost of capital. If q is high, the market price of firms is high relative to the 
replacement cost of capital, which means that new plant and equipment is cheap relative to 
the market value of the firm. Firms can then issue stock and get a high price for it relative to 
the cost of the plant and equipment. Investment spending therefore rises because firms can 
now buy a relatively large amount of new investment goods with only a small issue of stock. 
(Mishkin, 1996) 
 
Wealth effects are explained by the Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis (1954), which states 
that consumption is determined by lifetime resources of consumers. These life cycle resources 
consist primarily of financial assets, mostly stock and real estate. Interest rate cuts cause a rise 
in stock and real estate prices which raises households’ wealth. This means that consumers’ 
life cycle resources increase, thereby lifting consumer spending and aggregate demand. 
 
Balance sheet effects arise when increases in stock and real estate prices improve corporate 
and household balance sheets, raising their net worth. Higher net worth translates into higher 
collateral when borrowing money. This in turn increases lending, investment spending and 
ultimately aggregate demand. 
 
2.1.3. Credit channel 
 
The credit channel mechanism of monetary policy refers to the theory that a central bank's 
policy changes affect the amount of credit that banks issue to firms and consumers, which in 
turn affects the real economy. The credit channel emphasizes the concept of asymmetric 
information in financial markets, which makes it possible to separate two different channels; 
bank lending channel and balance sheet channel (Mishkin, 1996). 
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The bank lending channel is based on the view that banks are particularly well suited to solve 
asymmetric information problems in credit markets. In the real world, many borrowers do not 
have access to credit markets because market participants do not know whether the borrower 
is creditworthy or not. Banks play a special role in assessing the creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers, which leaves many borrowers dependent on the bank as source of financing. If 
there is no perfect substitute to retail bank deposits as source of funding, then expansionary 
monetary policy increases bank reserves and bank deposits, leading to a higher quantity of 
bank loans available. This will cause more borrowing leading to higher investment spending 
and ultimately, higher aggregate demand. An important implication of this view is that small 
firms should benefit the most because they are the ones who are often dependent on bank 
loans. Bigger firms often have direct access to bond and stock markets which they can use to 
collect financing. (Mishkin, 1996) 
 
The balance sheet channel refers to a theory which states that banks’ willingness to lend is 
dependent on the borrowers net worth. With adverse selection, firms that have a low net worth 
are exactly those who seek bank loans because they do not have access to other type of credit. 
Lower net worth of borrowers also translates into lower collateral for lenders. Therefore, a 
decline in borrowers’ net worth worsens the adverse selection problem and thus leads to 
decreased bank lending. Lower net worth of borrowers also increases the moral hazard 
problem because it means that owners have a lower equity stake in their firms, giving them 
incentives to engage in risky investment projects. Since riskier investment projects mean that 
lenders are less likely to be paid back, a decrease in firms’ net worth leads to a decrease in 
lending and ultimately in investment spending. (Mishkin, 1996) 
 
Monetaty policy can affect firms’ balance sheets in many ways. Firstly, as described in 
section 2.1.2, expansionary monetary policy can cause equity prices to rise, which raises 
borrowers’ net worth. Higher net worth lowers the adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, leading to increased loanable funds available and ultimately higher investment 
spending. Secondly, if the expansionary monetary policy reduces nominal interest rates, then 
firms’ balance sheets improve because of higher cash flows which are the result of lower 
financing costs. Higher cash flow raises net worth, leading to higher investment spending. 
Thirdly, because debt payments are often fixed in nominal terms, an expansionary monetary 
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policy that raises the price level causes real net worth of firms to rise, leading to higher 
investment spending. (Mishkin, 1996) 
 
2.1.4. Interest rate channel 
 
Interest rate channel of monetary policy is the most traditional mechanism and it is of 
particular interest in this thesis. In general, interest rate channel transmission can be split to 
two pieces. First phase of the interest rate channel refers to the idea that changes in central 
bank policy rates cause movements in money market rates, starting from short maturities and 
moving to longer maturities through the yield curve. In the second phase, changes in money 
market rates are expected to pass through to commercial bank lending and deposit rates, 
which in the final phase of monetary transmission affect savings, consumption, investment 
and ultimately aggregate demand and prices. According to Gigineishvili (2011), the impact of 
policy changes on money market rates is usually strong and immediate, because central banks 
normally operate at the lower end of the yield curve. The second phase of the process, market-
to-retail interest rate pass-through, is more diverse. 
 
Traditional Keynesian view of interest rate transmission can be characterized by the 
schematic displayed in figure 1. When the central bank decides to conduct expansionary 
monetary policy that is targeted to reducing the policy rate, the reduction in policy rate is 
expected to transmit to term interbank rates. In the second phase of interest rate transmission, 
lower interbank rates are expected to be transmitted to bank lending rates. However, the 
interest rate channel does not rely on nominal rate changes to have effects on consumption 
and investment; rather, it is the real interest rate that affects economic decisions. In a 
traditional Keynesian framework, prices are sticky which means that reductions in policy rate 
do not cause an immediate rise in price level. Therefore, real interest rates also decrease, 
causing the opportunity cost to consume and invest to decrease. Reductions in real interest 
rates are expected to lead to higher consumption and investment, and ultimately to higher 
aggregate demand. (Mishkin, 1996) 
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Figure 1. The interest rate channel of monetary policy 
 
The interest rate channel is based on multiple assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that the 
central bank has the ability to steer the nominal short rate (usually the overnight rate) by 
conducting open market operations. Secondly, price stickiness in the short run is assumed in 
order to explain why lower nominal rates also lead to lower real rates. Thirdly, it is assumed 
that lower short real rates also lead to lower long real rates. Finally, long real rates are 
assumed to stimulate consumption and investment spending, ultimately raising aggregate 
demand and output. 
 
Intuitively one would expect that in current crisis the interest rate channel has lost all its 
power because nominal rates are at or near zero lower bound. However, Mishkin (1996) 
reminded that the central bank can affect the real interest rate without changing the nominal 
rates if it is able to manage inflation expectations. Fisher (1930) theoretized that there is a link 
between nominal rates, real rates and inflation expectations. A simplified presentation of the 
Fisher equation can be expressed as: 
 
                 (2) 
 
 where   is the nominal interest rate,    is the real interest rate and    is expected rate of 
inflation. By rearranging the equation, we get 
 
                 (3) 
 
Equation (3) shows how the real rate is determined under Fisher’s Theory of Interest (1930).  
This form of presentation reveals that the central bank has two variables that it can try to 
manipulate in order to achieve desired changes in the real interest rate. Firstly, by using open 
market operations it can set the level of nominal rate, i.e. the overnight rate. In current 
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11 
 
environment, however, the nominal rate is constrained because nominal rates are already at or 
close to the zero lower bound. Therefore, the central bank can potentially further affect the 
real rate if it is able to control inflation expectations. As Mishkin (1996) stated, the zero lower 
bound does not necessarily eliminate the functioning of the interest rate channel. 
 
2.2. Determinants of overnight rate 
 
The overnight rate is determined in the overnight market where large banks lend and borrow 
funds to one another with maturity of one day. In the Eurozone the overnight rate is called 
EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average). It represents an effective overnight interest rate 
computed as a weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions undertaken 
by participating panel banks. According to Välimäki (2006), although the ECB has not 
explicitly announced an operational target for its monetary policy (contrary to the Fed), it is 
clear that the monetary policy implementation in the euro area aims at stabilizing short 
interest rates to a level close to the main ECB policy rate, which is the rate for main 
refinancing operations (MROs) with a maturity of one week. 
 
2.2.1. Open market operations and reserves 
 
Open market operations (OMOs) refer to an activity by a central bank to buy or sell 
government bonds in the open market. The usual aim of open market operations is to control 
the short term interest rate and monetary base MB, which can be written as: 
 
                 (4) 
 
where   is currency in circulation and   is reserves supplied. By buying bonds in the open 
market the central bank increases the monetary base and thus lowers the overnight rate. 
Monetary base is always increased by the amount of the open market purchase. However, 
effect of reserves depends whether the seller of the bonds keeps the proceeds in currency or in 
deposits. If the proceeds are kept in currency, the open market purchase has no effect on 
reserves, only to currency in circulation. If the proceeds are kept as deposits, reserves in the 
banking system increase by the amount of the open market purchase. (Mishkin, 2004) 
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Demand for reserves consists of required reserves and excess reserves. Cost of holding excess 
reserves is their opportunity cost, which is the overnight rate. If the overnight rate decreases, 
banks are more willing to keep excess reserves as insurance against deposit outflows because 
of lower opportunity cost. Therefore, demand curve slopes downwards. Supply of reserves 
consist of non-borrowed reserves Rn and loans from the central bank. Because borrowing in 
the interbank market is a substitute for taking out loans from the central bank, the supply 
curve is vertical if the overnight rate is below the lending rate; there is no lending from the 
central bank. However, if the overnight rate rises above lending rate, then reserves demanded 
will be satisfied by borrowing straight from the central bank, implying a flat supply curve. 
Market equilibrium occurs at the intersection of demand and supply curve shown in figure 2 
(Mishkin, 2004) 
 
 
Figure 2. Equilibrium in market for reserves (Mishkin, 2004) 
 
By conducting OMOs, the central bank can shift the supply curve; an open market purchase 
causes the overnight rate to fall, whereas an open market sale causes the overnight rate to rise 
(Mishkin, 2004). By shifting the supply curve, the central bank can respond to changes in 
13 
 
demand. For example, if demand curve shifts to the right because of a liquidity shock, the 
central bank can offset the rise in overnight rate by increasing open market operations. Since 
the central bank has a monopoly position in supplying reserves, it can effectively set the level 
of overnight rate by conducting OMOs (Mishkin, 2004). 
 
In the euro area, regular open market operations are conducted via refinancing operations, 
which are repurchase agreements where banks put up accepted collateral with the ECB and 
receive a cash loan in return. OMOs consist of main refinancing operations (MRO) with 
maturity of one week and longer term refinancing operations (LTRO) with maturity of three 
months. MROs serve to steer short term interest rates, to manage the liquidity situation, and to 
signal the stance of monetary policy in the euro area, while LTROs aim to provide additional, 
longer term refinancing to the financial sector. In addition to MROs and LTROs, ECB 
conducts fine-tuning operations which are aimed at smoothing the effects of unexpected 
liquidity fluctuations on interest rates.
1
 
 
2.2.2. Interest rate corridor system 
 
In the euro area, the ECB has adopted features of an interest rate corridor system which sets 
limits to the overnight rate. In a corridor system, a central bank sets up two standing facilities: 
a lending facility which supplies money overnight at a fixed lending rate against collateral and 
a deposit facility where banks can make overnight deposits at the central bank in order to earn 
a deposit rate
2
. The deposit rate provides a floor for the overnight rate, because no bank will 
lend money in the overnight market if it receives higher return by depositing the money to the 
central bank. Similarly, the lending rate provides a ceiling for the overnight rate, because no 
bank will borrow money from the overnight market at a rate higher than what the central bank 
charges. (Mishkin, 2004) The corridor system is illustrated in figure 3. 
 
                                                 
1
 For further information, see http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html 
 
2
 Marginal lending facility of the Eurosystem can be used by counterparties to receive overnight credit from a 
national central bank at a pre-specified marginal lending rate against eligible assets. Similarly, the deposit 
facility can used to make overnight deposits at a national central bank that are remunerated at the deposit rate. 
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Figure 3. Interest rate corridor system (Mishkin, 2004) 
 
Figure 3 shows that if the demand curve shifts between   
  and   
 , the overnight interest rate 
always remains between deposit and lending rates. Reserve supply curve is a step function 
because the central bank is ready to supply any amount banks want at lending rate and 
similarly accept any amount of deposits and pay the deposit rate. Rn stands for non-borrowed 
reserves that are determined by open market operations. In a corridor system, central bank has 
the ability to set the overnight rate whatever the demand for reserves, including zero demand. 
By increasing (decreasing) open market operations the central bank shifts the supply curve to 
the right (left), thereby lowering (raising) the overnight rate. (Mishkin, 2004) Naturally, by 
narrowing the interest rate corridor the central bank can reduce the volatility of the overnight 
rate in case of sudden changes in demand for reserves. 
 
In the euro area, design of the monetary policy operational framework implies that the 
overnight market rate usually fluctuates around the middle of the corridor given by the 
standing facilities rates. Figure 4 shows that before the crisis the EONIA has moved closely 
with the MRO rate. In 2008, ECB adopted a fixed rate full allotment policy (FRFA) which 
allowed banks to raise as much liquidity as they want with a fixed rate. The FRFA policy and 
extraordinary long term refinancing operations (LTRO) have substantially increased liquidity 
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in the market, which may explain why EONIA has clearly fluctuated under the MRO rate 
after 2008. Before the start of the crisis, EONIA has been in line with the MRO rate. 
 
 
Figure 4. ECB key rates between January 2002 and September 2012. Data source: ECB 
statistics, Bloomberg 
 
2.3. Determinants of term interbank rates 
 
2.3.1. Expectations hypothesis 
 
Expectations hypothesis (EH) was first introduced by Fisher (1896) and it is one of the oldest 
theories in finance aiming to explain the relationship between yields of different maturities. 
According to Guidolin et al. (2008), there are several versions of the theory and which been 
statistically tested and rejected using a wide variety of interest rates, over a variety of time 
periods and monetary policy regimes. Despite the fact that there exist little empirical support 
for full explanatory power of the EH, it provides a theoretical basis which can be used to 
explain determination of term interbank rates. 
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According to the pure expectations theory (PEH), long term interest rate will equal an average 
of short term interest rates that the market expects to occur over the life of the long term bond. 
This is based on the assumption that bonds with different maturities are perfect substitutes. 
Arbitrage arguments are used to explain why this is the case. Consider two investment 
strategies. One could invest in a two period bond or alternatively in a one period bond and roll 
over the investment after the first year. EH states that yields for both strategies must be the 
same. In  general form, this can be written as: 
 
         
           
         
     (5) 
 
where    is the annualized yield for n period investment and    is the one period forward rate 
at time n. Equation 5 shows that the expected yield for a n period investment can be derived 
using the yield for a n-1 period investment and the forward rate for period n. For example, 
consider a two period investment. If the spot rate for a one period investment is 4 % and the 
market expects that the one period spot rate (=current forward rate) for the second period will 
be 6 %, then using arbitrage arguments we are able to calculate what the spot rate for a two 
period investment must be: 
 
                     
                     
  
                       
 
             (6) 
 
Equation 6 shows that annualized yield for a two period investment must be 4,995 %. 
Otherwise there would be arbitrage which would be exploited immediately in an efficient 
market. Equation 6 also shows that we are able solve the one period forward rate that is 
implied by the yield curve because we know what annualized yields for one and two period 
investments are. 
 
By applying the EH to interbank rates, we should be able to derive term interbank rates from 
the overnight rate by repeatedly rolling over the overnight investment (Abbassi and Linzert, 
2011). However, this is not the case because term interbank rates include a maturity-specific 
risk premium (Litterman et al. 1991). Still, the basis for EURIBOR rates is determined by the 
overnight rate and ECB policy rates. For a historical presentation of EURIBOR rates, see 
appendix A. 
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2.3.2. Risk premium 
 
In general, risk premium in term interbank rates is the result of mainly three factors: term 
premium, liquidity premium and credit premium. The EH does not consider these factors as 
relevant for term rates since the theory is based on the assumption that bonds with different 
maturities are perfect substitutes. To fill the gap, other theories have been developed that are 
based on the EH but incorporate the missing factors in order to better describe the 
determination of term rates. 
 
Segmented markets theory of the term structure sees the market for bonds of different 
maturity as completely separate and segmented. The interest rate for each bond with a 
different maturity is then determined by the supply of and demand for that bond with no 
effects from expected returns on other bonds with other maturities, implying that the expected 
return from holding a bond of one maturity has no effect on the demand for a bond of another 
maturity. By allowing investors to prefer one maturity over another, the theory can explain 
why the yield curve might slope upwards but cannot explain why yields of different maturities 
tend to move together. (Mishkin 2004) 
 
Liquidity preference theory (Keynes 1936) and preferred habitat theory of the term structure 
state that the interest rate on a long term bond will equal an average of short-term interest 
rates expected to occur over the life of the long term bond plus a liquidity premium (referred 
to as a term premium in preferred habitat theory). Both theories assume that bonds of different 
maturities are not perfect substitutes. Also, investors are allowed to prefer one maturity over 
another. Generally investors tend to prefer shorter term bonds because they bear less interest 
rate risk. For these reasons, investors must be offered a positive liquidity premium to induce 
them to hold longer term bonds. (Mishkin 2004) 
 
It is worth noticing that EURIBOR rates are not annualized yields; they are simply rates for 
specific term loans between banks. For example, government bond yields are annualized 
yields calculated as average returns received each year by buying the bond at current market 
price and holding it until maturity. Still, term structure theories provide reasons why longer 
term investments include a risk premium. The risk premium that is incorporated in EURIBOR 
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rates can be measured by the spread between EURIBOR rates and OIS rates of corresponding 
maturity. A detailed rationale of this measurement will be provided in section 3.1. Figure 5 
shows the term structure of the risk premium on different year end dates, including 1M, 3M, 
6M and 12M maturities. 
 
 
Figure 5. Term structure of the EURIBOR-OIS spread (as basis points) in different year ends. 
 
When considering interbank rates, term and liquidity premia are also accompanied by credit 
premia. Since interbank rates are rates for uncollateralized loans between banks, there is a 
possibility of a bank defaulting on its liabilities. 
 
2.4. Unconventional monetary policy near zero lower bound 
 
Conventional monetary policy refers to the implementation of monetary policy via the interest 
rate channel. As presented in section 2.1.4, the central bank expects that changes in its policy 
rate are transmitted to money market rates, and further, to retail lending rates, which should 
affects consumer and investment decisions. However, in current market environment, central 
bank policy rates are at or near the zero lower bound, which constrains the use of further 
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policy rate changes as a tool to achieve an expansion in economic activities and inflation. For 
the purpose of stimulating the economy at or near zero lower bound, the central bank can use 
unconventional tools that work through other channels of monetary transmission that were 
presented in section 2.1. Such unconventional tools are categorized by Bernanke et al. (2004) 
into three categories; (1) expectation management strategy, (2) expansion of monetary base 
and (3) changes in composition of central bank balance sheet. 
 
2.4.1. Expectations management strategy (signaling) 
 
Expectations hypothesis presented in section 2.3.1. described how expected short term rates 
form the basis for longer term rates. However, it is not the short rate itself that is important in 
affecting economic decisions; rather, other asset prices such as longer term rates, equity prices 
and exchange rates are more important in affecting economic decisions. As these other asset 
prices are linked to the short rate, it follows that the ability of a central bank to influence 
economic decisions is critically dependent upon its ability to influence market expectations 
about future path of overnight interest rates, not the current level. (Woodford, 2003) If market 
participants expect that the nominal rate will be kept low, they will bid down longer term 
yields and boost up equity prices. 
 
At most basic level, implementation of monetary policy has two core elements. The first 
consists of signaling the desired policy stance. The second consists of operations that are used 
to make this policy stance effective. To see the importance of signaling, consider a policy rate 
announcement, which defines the desired level of the reference rate. To make the 
announcement effective, the central bank designs liquidity management operations to ensure 
that the reference rate tracks the desired policy rate closely. As such, liquidity management 
operations only play a technical and supportive role in achieving the target. Because the 
central bank has monopoly over the price of reserves, it is able to set the price to any level 
simply because it could stand ready to buy and sell unlimited amounts at the chosen price. 
This is the source of credibility for the signal. (Borio and Disyatat, 2009) Therefore, if the 
public believes that the central bank can set the price of reserves, the signal should become 
self-fulfilling, giving the central bank an important tool to conduct monetary policy.  
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In addition to signaling, central banks can affect expectation formation by committing in 
public to some policy rule. By committing to a policy rule market participants will update 
their expectations whenever desired target variables fluctuate from policy rule levels. 
However, in practice there are limits to central banks’ ability to fully commit to a specified 
policy rule, as the central bank could find it very difficult to describe the details of its actions 
to highly unusual circumstances. Because the ability to commit to precisely specified rules is 
limited, central bankers have found it useful in practice to supplement their actions with talk, 
communicating regularly with the public about the outlook for the economy and for future 
policy. Communication has been thought to be particularly important near the zero lower 
bound. (Bernanke et al., 2004) 
 
2.4.2. Expansion of monetary base (quantitative easing) 
 
Central banks normally lower their policy rate through open market purchases of securities, 
which increase the supply of bank reserves and put downward pressure on the rate that clears 
the reserves market. A sufficient injection of reserves will bring the policy rate close to zero, 
so that further interest rate reduction are not possible. However, nothing prevents the central 
bank from adding liquidity to the system beyond what is needed to achieve a policy rate of 
zero. (Bernanke et al., 2004) 
 
Quantitative easing refers to the action of a central purchasing financial assets, such as 
government bonds, from the private sector. These assets are paid with new central bank 
money, which should boost the amount of central bank money held by banks and the amount 
of deposits held by firms and households, because the central bank pays for the assets via the 
seller’s bank. This additional money then works through different channels to increase 
spending. First effect works through the asset price channel. When asset prices go up, lower 
yields reduce the cost of borrowing for households and companies. This should lead to higher 
consumption, investment spending and inflation. Second effect works through the bank 
lending channel. When assets are purchased from non-banks, banks gain both new reserves 
and new customer deposit. Higher level of liquid assets should encourage banks to extend 
more new loans, leading to higher consumption and investment. Third effect works through 
inflation expectations. By demonstrating that the central bank will do whatever it takes to 
meet the inflation target, inflation expectations should remain anchored to the target if there 
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was a risk that they might otherwise have fallen.  Even with very low nominal interest rates 
this would imply that real interest rates are kept at a low level, which should encourage 
greater spending. Higher inflation expectations could also influence price-setting behavior by 
firms, leading to a more direct impact on inflation. (Benford et al., 2009) Effects of 
quantitative easing are described in figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Effects of quantitative easing (Benford et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 6 shows the overall impact of quantitative easing. Demand curve is downward-sloping 
because yields on other assets represent the opportunity cost of holding money. If opportunity 
cost declines, then money holdings are expected to rise. Asset purchases shift the supply 
curve to the right, leaving markets at point B in which yields have fallen from Y1 to Y0. If 
markets are efficient, all asset prices are be expected to adjust quickly to news about asset 
purchases because of substitutability of different types of assets under market efficiency. As 
asset prices rise, nominal spending should increase and the demand for money should shift to 
the right from D0 to D1.  This will reduce the initial effect of a change in asset prices and 
yields, causing yields to rise from Y0 to Y*. The overall effect of asset purchases depends on 
the elasticity of money demand to changes in yields, i.e. the slope of the demand curve, and 
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the elasticity of money demand to changes in spending caused by higher asset prices, i.e. the 
extent of the shift of the demand curve. (Benford et al., 2009) 
 
Quantitative easing is sometimes confused with “credit easing”, a term coined by US Federal 
Reserve chairman Bernanke. According to Bernanke (2009), the focus of quantitative easing 
policy is on bank reserves, while the focus of credit easing is more targeted to relief credit 
pressures by purchasing specific securities from the private sector.
3
 
 
2.4.3. Changes in composition of central bank balance sheet (qualitative easing) 
 
Composition of assets held by the central bank offers another potential tool for monetary 
policy without changing the size of central bank balance sheet.
4
 By buying and selling 
securities of various maturities or other characteristics in the open market, the central bank 
could influence the relative supplies of these securities. If asset purchases and sales are 
targeted to assets that differ only in maturity, the central bank can try to manipulate the term 
structure of interest rates of that particular asset. Depending on whether the purchases are 
targeted to the short or long end of the yield curve, the central bank can shorten or lengthen 
the average maturity of the asset in question. (Bernanke et al., 2004) 
 
These changes in supplies should be effective only if financial markets are not perfect. This is 
because in a frictionless market, pricing of any financial asset would depend only on its state- 
and date-contingent payoffs. However, when markets are incomplete, the central bank might 
be able to affect term, liquidity and risk premiums that are related to the purchased securities. 
(Bernanke et al., 2004) 
 
2.5. Real interest rates 
 
As presented in section 2.1.4, the interest rate channel emphasizes the real rather than the 
nominal rate as being more important in determining consumer and business decisions. 
                                                 
3
 Speech given at Stamp Lecture, London School of Economics, January 2009. Available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm 
 
4
 Changing the composition of central bank’s balance sheet is often referred as “qualitative easing”. 
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According to the Fisher equation (2), central banks can affect the real interest rate by 
changing the nominal rate or by managing inflation expectations. Section 2.2.1. provided 
arguments that central banks have direct control over the short nominal rate, which also 
affects longer term rates as described by theories explaining the term structure of interest rates. 
However, at or near the zero lower bound, the Fisher equation (2) implies that the central 
bank’s ability to steer real interest rates depends on whether it is able to steer inflation 
expectations. If the central bank has a published inflation target, then proper anchoring of 
inflation expectations is necessary to conduct credible and effective monetary policy. 
 
Increases in money supply should eventually lead to a rise in prices, as there is a well-
documented long run empirical relationship between broad money growth and inflation across 
a variety of countries and monetary regimes
5
.  However, there is considerable uncertainty 
about the pace with which injections of money will be transmitted to prices
6
. 
 
2.5.1. Inflation expectations 
 
Inflation expectations are widely recognized to have a strong macroeconomic significance as 
wage negotiations, consumption and investment are affected by people’s expectations of 
future prices. A good starting point for analyzing expectation formation of future variables is 
the concept of rational expectations originally presented by Muth (1961), which has been 
widely incorporated in many modern macroeconomic models and is regarded as an 
underlying force that drives decision making. According to Mishkin (2004), the concept of 
rational expectations states that expectations are formed using all available information, not 
just past information as stated by adaptive expectations. Therefore, expectations will be 
affected by predictions of future monetary policy as well as by current and past monetary 
policy. Market participants are thought to change their expectations quickly when new 
publicly available information arrives to the market; as a result, economic variables should 
reflect all publicly available information correctly and without delay. 
 
                                                 
 
5
 See for example Benati (2005) and King (2002). 
 
6
 Benford et al. (2009) 
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For the central bank’s monetary policy, management of inflation expectations can be a very 
useful tool at least in two situations, which often coincide; deflationary environment and a 
liquidity trap. Mishkin (1996) explained that even without the assumption of sticky prices, the 
central bank can affect real interest rates by raising inflation expectations via an increase in 
money supply. However, it is important to notice that if nominal rates are at or near the zero 
lower bound, an increase in money supply is not purposed to lower them further. Also, in the 
European scope, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that because the ECB has an inflation target, 
raising inflation expectations support ECB’s credibility only if inflation falls below the central 
bank’s target or turn negative. 
 
Krugman (2010) explained why a deflationary environment is bad for the economy. Firstly, 
when the public expects falling prices, people become less willing to spend and to borrow. 
When prices are expected to fall, just holding cash becomes an investment with a real positive 
yield. Expectations of deflation can also cause a deflationary trap in which the economy stays 
depressed because people expect deflation. Secondly, falling prices worsen the position of 
borrowers by increasing the real burden of their debts. Fisher (1933) showed that although 
one might think that this is offset by a corresponding gain that lenders experience, borrowers 
are likely to be forced to cut their spending more than lenders are likely to increase their 
spending. Lastly, deflation has potential to cause high unemployment because of nominal 
wage rigidities; in a deflationary economy, wages should fall with the price level so that 
producers would not have to cut employment as their revenue decreases.
7
 
 
In addition to a being important in a deflationary environment, inflation expectations have 
been at the centre of the “liquidity trap debate” which is concerned about the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in such an environment. Keynes (1936) represented the traditional view of 
the matter. He described the liquidity trap as a situation which occurs when people hoard cash 
because they expect an adverse event such as deflation. Consequently, Keynes (1936) argued 
that in an environment of low nominal rates and cash hoarding, the economy is trapped in the 
sense that an expansion of the money supply does not succeed in stimulating inflation and 
economic activity. However, this argument has been challenged, for example, by Krugman 
(2000) and by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) who represent the modern view of the matter. 
They have argued that near the zero lower bound, the central bank can escape the liquidity 
                                                 
7
Available at: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/02/why-is-deflation-bad/# 
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trap by creating inflationary expectations which do not lower nominal rates, but can lower the 
real interest rate. If the public expects that the real value of their cash holdings decreases, an 
incentive to stop hoarding cash is created which is an essential key that should restore 
economic activity. 
 
Krugman (2000) argued that a credible commitment to expand the future money supply will 
be expansionary even in a liquidity trap, because it changes inflation expectations of the 
public. He suggested that this could be achieved if the central bank loosened its commitment 
to price stability. Furthermore, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argued that the current level 
of the short rate is not relevant for stimulating the economy; rather, what actually matters is 
the private sector’s expectation of the future path of short rates, as this path determines longer 
term interest rates, exchange rates and other asset prices that are relevant for current spending 
decisions. Consequently, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argued that the central bank can 
increase inflationary expectations by committing to keep nominal rates low. This can be 
interpreted as a form of expectation management strategy (or signaling). 
 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) model also provided justification for quantitative easing, 
which should lead to higher inflationary expectations. If the central bank has a published 
inflation target and actual inflation falls below its respective target, the central bank has 
justification to expand the monetary base. In addition to providing justification for 
quantitative easing, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argued, in line with Krugman, that the 
central bank could raise inflationary expectations by starting to make announcements of the 
monetary policy that it intends to conduct in the future. One way to do this would be to 
commit to sustain monetary expansion even after the liquidity trap was over, and 
simultaneously, to commit to keep future nominal rates low so that expectations of nominal 
rates do not change in response to a monetary expansion. 
 
As the topic is quite fresh, there is very little empirical evidence exists on whether the central 
bank can actually change the public’s inflation expectations by conducting unconventional 
monetary policy. Szczerbowicz (2011) seems to be the only paper that studied how long run 
inflation expectations were affected by the two QE programs conducted by the Fed. The 
author used a market-based measure of inflation expectations and found that QE1 had very 
little effect, but QE2 much more effective in raising long run inflation expectations. She 
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believed that the difference between the effectiveness of these programs were related to 
different economic outlooks at the time of the operations; according to her, QE1 was 
implemented when the U.S. was still in a recession while the decision about QE2 was 
undertaken when the economic recovery was proceeding. As an intuitive consideration, this 
makes sense because QE1 may have been more effective in reducing deflationary concerns, 
rather than actually contributing to higher inflationary expectations, contrast to QE2. 
 
2.5.2. Persistence of real interest rates 
 
According to the  Fisher (1930) hypothesis, nominal interest rates should vary one-for-one 
with expected inflation in the long-run; for example, if inflation rises from a constant level of 
2 % to a constant level of 4 %, the Fisher equation (2) shows that nominal rates should rise 2 
percentage points. Thus, real interest rates, which represent the difference between nominal 
interest rates and expected inflation, must be stationary. However, the stationary properties of 
real interest rates have been questioned in several studies starting from Rose (1988). Real 
interest rate persistence means that when, for example, inflation expectations rise, the real 
interest rate falls and does not immediately revert to its previous level (i.e., is not stationary) 
because the nominal rate does not react immediately to changes in expected inflation. For the 
functioning of the interest rate transmission channel, persistence of real interest rates 
demonstrates that by changing inflation expectations the central bank can affect real interest 
rates, which should praise the effectiveness of the interest rate channel in transmitting 
monetary policy decisions to the real economy. 
 
Neely and Rapach (2008) reviewed the empirical literature on real interest rate persistence. 
Their conclusion based on existing research was that real interest rates are highly persistent 
when nominal rates are adjusted for both actual and expected inflation; the real rate is found 
to be substantially above or below the sample mean. This implies that nominal rates and 
inflation (expectations) do not move one-for-one, causing doubts on validity of economic 
theory, as the real interest rate plays a central role in many important financial and 
macroeconomic models, including the consumption-based asset pricing model, neoclassical 
growth model, and models of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
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2.6. Empirical evidence of interest rate pass through in euro area 
 
As presented in section 2.1.4., interest rate pass through can be split to two phases; 
transmission from central bank policy rate to money market rates and transmission of money 
market rates to bank lending rates. These changes should ultimately affect decisions in real 
economy. According to Gigineishvili (2011), the impact of policy changes on money market 
rates is usually strong and immediate, but evidence of transmission from money market rates 
to retail rates is more diverse. 
 
2.6.1. Transmission from policy rates to market rates 
 
Busch and Nautz (2010) provided empirical evidence on controllability and persistence of 
money market rates in the euro area. They defined the expectations-adjusted policy spread as 
the difference between market rates and expected average policy rate (overnight rate) over 
corresponding maturity. Interbank rates are directly observable from the market; expected 
average overnight rate is reflected in EONIA swap rates
8
. According to Busch and Nautz 
(2010), controllability of longer term interbank rates requires that the persistence of their 
deviations from the central bank's policy rate (i.e. the policy spreads) remain sufficiently low. 
A persistent policy spread means that longer term interbank rates do not adjust immediately to 
changes in central bank policy rate. As EONIA swap rates adjust without delay to central 
bank communications and actions, the pace of transmission should be reflected in the 
persistence of policy spreads. 
 
According to empirical evidence by Busch and Nautz (2010), the controllability and 
persistence of longer term rates depend on the predictability and communication of monetary 
policy. Unclear policy signals about future interest rate decisions should lead to larger 
forecast errors and more persistent policy spreads. According to empirical evidence by Busch 
and Nautz (2010), from 2000 to 2007 the average policy spreads for 14 different maturities 
have varied between 1 to only 7 basis points with standard deviations of about 3 basis points 
for corresponding maturities, suggesting lower persistence when compared to policy spreads 
                                                 
8
 EONIA swap rates are the main instrument for speculating on and hedging against interest rate movements and 
therefore give a very good approximation for market's expectations of the average overnight rate over the 
duration of the swap. For a more detailed rationale of EONIA swap rates, see section 3.2. 
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that are not adjusted for expectations (i.e., market rate less current policy rate). According to 
Busch and Nautz (2010), the lower persistence of expectations-adjusted policy spreads is 
largely attributable to the ECB’s new operational framework implemented in 2004, because it 
significantly improved communication of monetary policy. However, Busch and Nautz (2010) 
estimates show that the expectations-adjusted policy spreads exhibit long memory, which 
means that shocks such as policy rate changes do not cause an immediate adjustment in 
market rates. According to Busch and Nautz (2010), this provides evidence that the ECB’s 
control of longer term interbank rates might be weaker than expected. 
 
In addition to policy spread persistence, transmission from policy rates to market rates can be 
affected by investors’ (banks’) risk tolerance. If investors are risk-neutral and markets 
efficient, long term rates can be derived from average short term rates that are expected to 
prevail, as stated by the expectations hypothesis. If investors are risk averse, the yield curve 
would be steeper because investors demand a liquidity premium on longer maturities, as 
suggested by the liquidity preference theory. Finally, if markets for different maturities were 
segmented as stated by segmented markets theory, interest rates at the two ends of the yield 
curve could be disconnected, resulting in the breakdown of the transmission mechanism. 
(Gigineishvili, 2011) 
 
2.6.2. Transmission from market rates to retail rates 
 
According to Gigineishvili (2011), transmission from market rates to bank lending rates can 
be explained using the cost of funds approach. In this approach, money market rates represent 
opportunity costs of funds because banks rely on them for short term borrowing. They also 
represent opportunity the cost for firms and households, because they represent the yield of 
investing in the money market. In addition to the cost of funding, banks’ retail product pricing 
will also include a premium for maturity and risk transformation involved in their activities. 
Therefore, there is positive long run relationship between money market rates and retail rates, 
which can be formalized as in equation (7): 
 
                   (7) 
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where    is the retail rate,   is the premium (markup charged by the bank),   is the long run 
pass-through coefficient and    is the money market rate. If markets were perfect and banks 
risk-neutral,   would equal 1, implying complete pass-through. However, according to 
Gigineishvili (2011), empirical evidence usually suggests that pass-through is incomplete 
with   < 1; the long run pass-through varies widely by countries and markets. Equation (7) 
can also be modified in order to better account short run pass-through. As a general 
conclusion from estimates of Gigineishvili (2011), more advanced economies appear to have 
stronger pass-through in the long-run. However, in the short-run there seems to be some 
persistence of market interest rates, as the short run pass-through coefficients are 
systematically smaller than long run estimates. It is also worth noticing that Gigineishvili 
(2011) estimates show that the long run pass-through coefficient in euro area is significantly 
smaller than in USA; coefficients were approximately 0,3 and 0,7 for euro area and USA, 
respectively. 
 
Gigineishvili (2011) also provided a brief literature overview on structural determinants of 
interest rate pass through, which has received less attention in empirical literature. In general 
terms, existing literature has found evidence that a higher inflationary environment, capital 
mobility, money market development and competition in the banking sector result in a 
stronger pass-through. Gigineishvili (2011) estimates highlight that higher inflation and 
market interest rates result in better pass through. A potential explanation is that since high 
inflation and interest rates are associated with larger uncertainty, banks are passing the risk to 
borrowers. It is also notable that similarly to some previous evidence, excess liquidity in the 
banking sector is found to weaken pass-through, which is particularly relevant in current 
market environment. 
 
Findings of Gigineishvili (2011) and previous literature have significant implications for 
monetary policy. Gigineishvili (2011) concluded that if pass-through is weak and cannot be 
improved, for example by developing stronger financial markets, increasing capital mobility 
and competition in banking sector, a monetary framework that relies on strong interest rate 
pass-through, such as inflation targeting, may not be an optimal choice. This is very 
interesting for central banks in most advanced countries, including the euro area; since the 
ECB has adopted an inflation targeting framework, it is in its own interests to strengthen 
interest rate transmission. However, the positive relationship between inflation and the 
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strength of pass-through found in empirical studies suggests that by being successful in 
achieving its key target of reducing inflation close to 2 %, the ECB actually seems to 
contribute to the weakening of interest rate transmission. Although this is naturally 
controversial, Gigineishvili (2011) pointed out that a strong interest rate pass-through and an 
inflation target need not to be viewed as policy tradeoffs; a weakened pass-through 
attributable to successful control of inflation could be compensated with other means 
presented above that contribute to a better pass-through. 
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3. EUROPEAN INTERBANK MARKETS IN CRISIS OF 2007-2012 
 
Starting in August 2007, losses from subprime mortgages in USA started to affect bank 
lending behavior in the interbank market as realization of risks led banks to became more 
careful in their lending activities. In order to restore confidence in the interbank market, 
central banks reacted by conducting unconventional monetary policies as the traditional 
interest rate transmission was not the best mechanism to calm money markets.  This chapter 
focuses on interbank market functioning in crisis. Before moving on to measurement of 
interbank risk and unconventional measures taken by the ECB, some theoretical background 
is provided to shed light on potential problems that the banking sector might have with 
respect to proper functioning or contributing to its social welfare function. 
 
3.1. Theoretical framework for interbank markets in crisis 
 
There are several different aspects that can be used to identify potential problems in the 
interbank market. Starting from theoretical works that explain interbank market functioning 
through market participation, Flannery (1996) proposed a model of competitive lending with 
asymmetric information. He categorized borrowers as “good” and “bad” and allowed banks to 
differ in their ability to assess borrowers’ creditworthiness. During "normal" times, private 
lenders are assumed to assess one another's financial conditions with reasonable accuracy. 
However, if the financial system incorporates systemic risk and a large shock hits the system, 
normal lending may become insufficient in funding all illiquid banks. If it is feared that 
financial conditions of other banks have weakened, a lender's assessment of its own 
underwriting abilities and that of its competitors may become less certain, even for most 
accurate lenders. Thus the model implies that private loan markets can fail not because the 
average borrower's credit quality deteriorates, but because lenders become less certain about 
how to identify risks. Higher rates can occur without even without some lenders retreating 
from the market, which means that full participation can exist. (Flannery, 1996) 
 
Flannery (1996) also considers to role of lender of last resort (LLR) in bank lending. A 
government LLR has two advantages over private lenders: its size and its immunity to 
bankruptcy. A government LLR can finance the entire banking sector's liquidity needs, and it 
can do so quickly without coordination problems. Moreover, in order to protect itself against 
32 
 
adverse selection, the LLR can afford to lend at a rate below any rate prevailing in private 
lending. However, if some private lender’s remain sufficiently confident of their underwriting 
abilities, then without LLR intervention, they could charge lower rates than the LLR. The 
LLR should therefore evaluate whether lending below the market rate produces lower social 
costs than those associated with letting “good” banks pay the LLR rate, which is higher than 
the rate “good” banks would have gotten from the market without LLR intervention. In 
normal times, the model provides no justification for LLR lending to individual banks; once 
the LLR has provided sufficient aggregate liquidity through open market operations
9
, it 
should rely on private lending to channel funds so that solvent but illiquid firms are funded. 
The model justifies LLR intervention only in crisis times. However, Rochet and Tirole (1996) 
pointed out that the bad incentive effects of this “too big to fail” policy can be avoided by 
subsidizing the troubled institution's counterparties instead of bailing out the troubled 
institution itself. 
 
Freixas and Holthausen (2005) studied international interbank market integration under 
unsecured lending when cross-country information is noisy. They consider peer monitoring as 
a key factor in improving interbank market efficiency; banks monitor each other by obtaining 
signals concerning their peers’ solvency probabilities. A critical assumption of their model is 
that cross border information or signals about banks is less precise than home country 
information. Consequently, when a bank tries to borrow funds from a foreign bank, it does so 
either because of a liquidity shortage in home country or because it has created a “bad” signal 
and is thereby unable to borrow funds in home country. Their model argues that a perfect 
liquidity smoothing cannot exist between countries, because cross-border lending involves 
interest rate premia which reflect the adverse selection of borrowers in the international 
market. Although interbank market imperfections could be related to exchange risk, the 
Freixas and Holthausen (2005) model argued that the main barrier to an integrated 
international market is the existence of asymmetric information between banks in different 
countries. Only if cross-border information is sufficiently precise, the integration of markets is 
possible. 
 
                                                 
9
 Sufficient amount of liquidity can also be called “neutral” amount of liquidity. According to Nikolaou (2009), 
“neutral” amount of liquidity is the amount that satisfies the liquidity demand of the system, to the extent that 
interbank rates are in line with policy rates. 
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In addition to above models explaining interbank market functioning via market participation, 
there are some theoretical guidelines explaining market functioning through alternative lender 
behavior. Dudley (2008) suggested that during the current crisis banks with low equity capital 
were forced to decrease interbank lending in order to avoid excessive leverage. Acharya et al. 
(2008) suggested that interbank markets are characterized by moral hazard, asymmetric 
information, and monopoly power in times of crisis; banks with excess liquidity do not 
necessarily provide it to the interbank market because they might strategically try to gain 
market share at expense of illiquid banks that are forced to sell assets at fire sale prices. These 
two views yield opposite predictions concerning the relationship between lender’s liquidity 
and the lending rate. In Dudley (2008), lower liquidity leads to higher lending rates offered; in 
Acharya et al. (2008), high liquidity may coincide with high lending rate. Still, both views 
provide justification for central bank lending in crisis times. 
 
In contrast, there are theoretical works that do not support LLR intervention because it may 
dilute the social welfare enhancement role of the interbank market. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) 
argued that demandable-debt banking can be understood as optimal means of intermediation, 
because in an environment of asymmetric information and possible moral hazard behavior by 
the bank, depositors have incentives to monitor banks. As deposits can be withdrawn anytime 
in demandable-debt banking, bankers should fear that deposits are withdrawn if invested in 
risky projects that enhance the welfare of bankers at the expense of depositors’ interests. 
Therefore, because depositors monitor banks on how they use their deposits, bad banks are 
liquidated because deposits should roll from bad banks to good banks. This process should 
thereby enhance social welfare by allocating funds to effective use and maintain market 
discipline. 
 
In the context of interbank markets, and based on theoretical framework by Calomiris and 
Kahn (1991), Calomiris (1999) argued that banks should be required to issue subordinated 
debt, so that potential holders of the debt, other financial institutions, were incentivized to 
monitor the issuer. In his view, the interbank market should be an alternative mechanism for 
depositor monitoring in order to achieve and enhance market discipline. The need for 
alternative mechanism stems from the fact that retail deposits are usually guaranteed by 
adeposit insurance scheme, which removes depositors’ incentives to monitor banks. As 
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interbank claims, on the other hand, are generally unsecured, banks should have strong 
incentives to monitor their counterparts. 
 
However, there are also some theoretical works arguing that incentives for banks to monitor 
each other may be low. Huang and Ratnovski (2008) extended the framework by Calomiris 
and Khan (1991) so that the signals received by financiers on counterpart solvency are noisy. 
They show that this simple alteration can significantly lower financiers’ efforts to monitor 
counterparts and gives them excess incentives to withdraw funding, thus triggering inefficient 
liquidations of the counterparts. On the other hand, Rochet and Tirole (1996) argue in favor of 
another mechanism that destroys market discipline. They argue that “…the current system of 
interbank linkages suffers from its hybrid nature: On one hand, banks engage in largely 
decentralized mutual lending. On the other hand, government intervention, voluntary or 
involuntary, destroys the very benefit of a decentralized system, namely, peer monitoring 
among banks” (p. 735). In other words, if banks believe that the LLR is unable to commit not 
to rescue troubled banks, they may have no incentives to take costly efforts to monitor their 
counterparts. 
 
Very little empirical evidence exists on whether banks do monitor their counterparts or not. 
Furfine (2001) found that banks do monitor their interbank market counterparts in normal 
circumstances, charging higher rates to riskier borrowers. On the other hand, Angelini et al. 
(2011) results suggest that borrower characteristics were not an important determinant of the 
interest rate charged on interbank loans before the current financial crisis. They believe that 
this may be because of low incentives to monitor counterparts as described above. However, 
after the start of current financial crisis in August 2007, they found that riskier institutions did 
pay higher rates so as to reflect their lower creditworthiness. Based on these two pieces of 
evidence, precise conclusions cannot be drawn. 
 
3.2. EURIBOR-OIS spread 
 
Because maturities of deposit and marginal lending facilities is one day, the interest rate 
corridor system only binds the interest rate with corresponding maturity, i.e. the overnight rate. 
As presented in section 2.3.2, term interbank rates include a risk premium. In order to 
quantify the risk premium in term interbank rates, a measure of risk free rate is necessary. The 
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maturity of the risk free rate needs to be the same as the comparable EURIBOR rate.
10
 For 
this purpose, fixed rates from overnight index swaps (OIS) are commonly used because they 
involve very little default risk
11
. 
 
OIS contracts are interest rate swaps that involve two parties who agree to swap their interest 
rate payments, but not the principal, for an agreed period.  The fixed interest rate is agreed at 
the time of the trade while the floating rate will be known when the contract period ends. The 
floating rate in OIS contracts is the overnight rate. At the end of the agreed period, parties 
look up how much did each party pay in interest. The floating rate is determined by 
compounding the overnight rate every day over the contract period and calculating an average 
overnight rate that has been paid under the contract period. The procedure is similar to one 
used in equation (5). If the compounded average interest rate in the end of the contract period 
paid by party A was, for example  l,5 %, and the fixed rate paid by party B was 2 %, then 
party A will pay the difference of 0,5 % to party B, because they agreed to swap interest rate 
payments. Similarly, if the compounded average interest rate was be 2,5 %, then party B 
would pay the difference of 0,5 % to party A. 
 
Following the above example, let’s assume that the current overnight rate is 1 % and that the 
market expects that the overnight rate will continue to be 1 % on each day over 30 days. In 
this setting, the average floating rate paid by party A will be                       
  
 
=        
  
 1,01 or 1 %. However, if the market expects that the overnight rate rises to 2 % 
after the first 15 days, then the average floating rate will be               
  
 1,0149 or 
1,49 %. By entering into an OIS contract, the party which has a 30 day loan at a fixed rate of 
2 % can take a speculative position that the overnight rate will not rise over the 30 day period 
so much that the compounded average interest rate would exceed 2 %. This leads party B to 
offer a 30 day OIS contract in which it commits to swap a fixed rate of 2 % to the 
                                                 
10
 The EURIBOR rate is the rate at which Euro interbank term deposits are offered by one prime bank to another 
within the Eurozone. EURIBOR rates for different maturities are published at 11.00 a. m. CET. It is quoted for 
spot value (two Target days) and on actual / 360 day basis. A representative panel of banks is asked to quote 
those rates at which, to the best of their knowledge, euro interbank term deposits are being offered within the 
euro area. The calculation of EURIBOR rates includes eliminating the highest and lowest 15% of all quotes 
collected. The remaining rates will be averaged and rounded to three decimal places. 
 
11
 OIS contracts do not involve the exchange of principal. Therefore, only the interest payment, which is 
exchanged at the end of the contract period, can be defaulted. 
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compounded average interest rate. However, if party A also expects that the overnight rate 
rises to 2 % after the first 15 days, then party A would not accept the OIS contract at fixed 
rate of 2 % because it would expect to make a loss (2-1,49 = 0,51 %) in the deal. Therefore, 
party A forces party B to cut the offered fixed rate so that it better reflects party A’s 
expectations of the future evolution of overnight rates. Taken to the market level, OIS rates 
are determined so that they best reflect market participants’ expectations of future overnight 
rates. 
 
In the euro area, OIS contracts are called EONIA swaps. They are the main instrument used 
by market participants to take speculative positions on expected central bank actions. 
Similarly to all swaps, EONIA swaps are also used for hedging purposes. Because OIS rates 
are a good proxy for the risk free rate, they can be used to quantify the risk premium 
incorporated in term interbank rates. The EH implies that without a risk premium involved, 
term interbank rates should be the same as OIS rates with corresponding maturity. Otherwise 
there would be an arbitrage possibility
12
. Because central bank policy rate expectations are 
included in both rates, the spread is stripped from policy rate expectations, leaving a measure 
of risk premium that banks pay when they borrow funds for a pre-determined period relative 
to the expected cost from repeatedly rolling over funding in the overnight market. (Abbassi 
and Linzert, 2011) 
 
Since the adoption of a single currency, EURIBOR-OIS spreads have been very close to zero 
throughout the decade; for example, the three-month 3M EURIBOR has evolved very close to 
the respective 3M OIS rate with an average spread of around 6 basis points in the period 
between January 2000 and August 2007. The levels of the spreads have all been close to zero 
with very low volatility prior to the crisis.
13
 Developments after 2007 are displayed in figure 7. 
 
                                                 
12
 For example, if 3M EURIBOR was 3 % and 3M OIS rate was 2 %, then a bank could make a 3M loan of €100 
in the interbank market, fund the loan by borrowing €100 each day in the overnight market, and hedge the 
interest rate risk related to borrowing in the overnight market by purchasing a 3M OIS contract, thereby locking 
its funding costs at 2 % while receiving 3 % in interest. 
 
13
 For a historical presentation of the spreads, see appendix B. 
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Figure 7. EURIBOR-OIS spreads for different maturities (in basis points). Data Source: 
Bloomberg 
 
Figure 7 clearly shows that the levels of EURIBOR-OIS spreads rose substantially after the 
start of financial crisis in August 2007. The spreads reached their highest levels after Lehman 
Brothers collapsed in September 2008. The 12M spread was at its maximum of 239 basis 
ponits in 10 October 2008, a few weeks after Lehman Brothers collapsed. In addition, the 
spreads have become highly volatile and the risk premium clearly rose with maturity. 
Empirical literature generally views that the risk premium in longer EURIBOR rates reflects 
banks’ reluctance to engage in longer term lending. This is because banks may need excess 
funds themselves or because they have lost confidence on counterparts’ solvency.  
 
3.3. Causes of high interbank spreads 
 
A general view among academic literature is that the risk premium incorporated in term 
interbank rates is the result of counterparty credit risk, liquidity risk or some combination of 
the two. In this section, different sources of risk are considered. 
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3.3.1. Credit risk 
 
First source of risk associated in bank lending is the risk that counterparty of an agreement is 
not able to or does not want to pay back the loan it has received. This risk stems from the fact 
that most loans between banks are uncollateralized. In this thesis, counterparty credit risk is 
defined as in Cecchetti et al. (2009): counterparty credit risk refers to “the risk that a 
counterparty will not settle an obligation in full value, either when due or at any time 
thereafter.” (p. 57) 
 
Heider et al. (2009) studied the functioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market 
in order to explain observed developments before and during recent financial crisis. They 
provided a model of how the risk in long term assets of banks can increase the likelihood of 
liquidity hoarding. The key factor in the model is counterparty risk which is amplified by 
adverse selection. Counterparty risk stems from the asset quality of counterparties. Each bank 
is assumed to know the distribution of risk in the banking sector and is privately informed 
about the risk of their own assets; however, banks cannot observe the risk of their 
counterparties’ asset quality. Depending on the level and distribution of counterparty risk, 
Heider et al. (2009) model allows various interbank market regimes to arise. 
 
In the first regime, when the level and dispersion of risk are low, the unsecured interbank 
market functions smoothly despite counterparty risk and asymmetric information. The interest 
rate for unsecured loans is low and all banks manage their liquidity using the interbank market. 
Under asymmetric information, riskier banks pose an externality on safer banks because all 
banks pay the same rate; under asymmetric information, it is not possible for lenders to 
recognize riskier borrowers in order to charge higher rates for higher risk. But the externality 
is small compared to the cost of obtaining liquidity outside the unsecured market. Therefore, 
the first regime implies full participation and a low interbank spread. 
 
In the second regime, the level of counterparty risk is high; safer banks with a liquidity 
shortage may find the mispricing (externality) caused by riskier borrowers too large, causing 
them to leave the unsecured market and to lend elsewhere. This destroys the full participation 
equilibrium, as good risks are driven out of the market, allowing adverse selection to arise. 
Liquidity is still traded but the interest rate rises to reflect the presence of riskier banks. 
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In the third regime, the interbank market may break down if the dispersion of risk is high. 
Once the safest banks with a liquidity shortage drop out of the interbank market, liquidity 
hoarding can occur; banks prefer to hoard liquidity instead of lending it out to the market 
because only riskier banks are present. Although the interest rate increases to reflect higher 
counterparty risk, it may not rise enough to encourage lenders, who still are present at the 
market, to lend to an adverse selection of borrowers. This potentially causes a breakdown in 
the interbank market. Therefore, Heider et al. (2009) model implies that the interest rate rises 
because creditworthiness of the average borrower deteriorates due to lower market 
participation. Finally, it is possible that even riskier borrowers find the unsecured interest rate 
too high and prefer to obtain liquidity elsewhere. 
 
3.3.2. Liquidity risk 
 
Second source of risk associated in interbank lending is liquidity risk. According to Nikolaou 
(2009), liquidity can be classified into three different types: central bank liquidity, market 
liquidity and funding liquidity. The first relates to liquidity provided by the central bank, the 
second to the ability of trading in the markets, and the third to the ability of banks to fund 
their positions. According to Nikolaou (2009), central bank liquidity can be defined as the 
liquidity supplied by the central bank that satisfies liquidity needs of the financial system. 
Central bank liquidity is typically measured by the flow of base money supplied in open 
market operations. Because the central bank is always able to supply sufficient amounts of 
base money due to its monopoly position, there is no definition of central bank liquidity risk. 
 
Following the consensus reached in studies, Nikolaou (2009) defined market liquidity as “the 
ability to trade an asset at short notice, at low cost and with little impact on its price.” (p. 14) 
The author continued that it therefore follows those three different aspects can be used to 
evaluate market liquidity, from which the ability to trade is most important. According to 
Nikolaou (2009), two different types of market liquidity can be distinguished: interbank 
market liquidity, which refers to liquidity traded among banks such as interbank loans, and 
asset market liquidity, which refers to assets that are traded among financial agents. These 
two types are the main sources for banks to acquire funding liquidity from the markets, and 
therefore help to explain the interactions between market liquidity and funding liquidity. 
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Following the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, Nikolaou (2009) defined funding 
liquidity as “the ability of banks to meet their liabilities, unwind or settle their positions as 
they come due”. (p. 13) References to funding liquidity have also been made from point of 
view of investors and traders, where funding liquidity refers to the ability to raise cash or 
capital at short notice. It consists of four different sources of funding: customer deposits, 
interbank loans, securitization of illiquid assets and central bank loans. Interbank market 
funding is arguably the most important source of funding for banks. 
 
According to Nikolaou (2009), there are several interconnections between all three forms of 
liquidity risk and their significance varies in time. In normal times, liquidity flows easily 
among the three liquidity types, thereby creating a circle that stimulates the stability of the 
financial system. With efficient markets and a “neutral” amount of liquidity supplied by the 
central bank, liquidity should be efficiently distributed to agents who need it most. However, 
in turbulent times, the linkages may produce a spiral of illiquidity in the financial system. 
Nikolaou (2009) argued that the liquidity risk spiral can be caused by asymmetric information 
and incomplete markets that result in coordination problems between depositors, banks or 
traders. Because banks have an intermediation role as maturity transformers, i.e. taking short 
term (liquid) deposits and turning them into long term (illiquid) loans, they are considered 
fragile due to the maturity mismatch. Given the fragility, banks are subject to bank runs, 
which represent the extreme form of bank funding liquidity risk. (Nikolaou, 2009). 
Eisenschmidt and Tapking (2009) provided further examples on funding liquidity risk. 
According to them, funding liquidity risk refers to the risk that lenders face a liquidity shock 
before term loans mature. Alternatively, the probability of higher funding costs for the lender 
may increase when such a liquidity shock arrives. 
 
Funding liquidity risk of a single bank, however, is of limited concern. The real issue arises 
when funding liquidity risk is transmitted to more than one bank, becoming systemic and 
therefore transforming to market liquidity risk through interbank markets. As banks are linked 
by a common market for liquidity, individual bank failures can potentially shrink the common 
pool of liquidity and therefore spread the shortage to other banks. Furthermore, liquidity 
shortages can stimulate fears of counterparty insolvency because of incomplete markets, i.e. 
there is no perfect hedge against future liquidity shortages, and because of information 
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asymmetries about solvency of banks, i.e. it is not possible to distinguish whether 
counterparty banks are illiquid or insolvent. Funding liquidity risk can also transmit to market 
liquidity risk through asset markets; if the interbank market liquidity-providing channel is 
disrupted, banks may need to use fire-sales of assets to obtain liquidity. (Nikolaou, 2009) 
 
In addition to funding liquidity risk transmitting to market liquidity risk, there may also be 
second round effects working in opposite direction because of market-valued balance sheets, 
creating an endogenous loop between funding and market liquidity risks. Nikolaou (2009) 
proposed that in order to prevent second round effects, the central bank could break the loop 
with emergency liquidity provision in the market, thereby possibly avoiding contagion and 
spillover effects. 
 
3.4. Unconventional measures of ECB during crisis of 2007-2012 
 
Cecioni et al. (2011) provided an excellent overview on unconventional monetary policy that 
summarizes all unconventional actions taken by the ECB between August 2007 and 
September 2011. The actions are relevant for relieving stress in the interbank market and 
consequently may have the potential, to some extent, to restore functioning of the interest rate 
channel. As a general note, unconventional monetary policies have been conducted since the 
start of the crisis in 2007. However, they have not always been effective as the interbank 
markets were dysfunctional despite several unconventional interventions before Lehman 
Brothers collapsed. A potential explanation is that the interventions were initially too small 
and that their effectiveness was to be seen only after the scope of interventions were brought 
up to a higher level. 
 
Table 1 provides a summary on unconventional actions conducted by the ECB. The table is 
based on Cecioni et al. (2011). However, it has been simplified and updated to match actions 
taken as of 30 September 2012. Updated information in table 1 is compiled from ECB press 
announcements and ECB website.
 14
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Press releases by year can be found at : http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/index.en.html 
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Fixed rate full 
allotment policy 
(FRFA) in 
MROs and 
LTROs
6M LTROs 12M LTROs 36M LTROs
Special term 
refinancing 
operations
Fine tuning 
operations
Currency 
swap 
agreements
Covered Bond 
Purchase 
Programme 
(CBPP)
Covered Bond 
Purchase 
Programme 2 
(CBPP2)
Securities 
Markets 
Programme 
(SMP)
Outright 
Monetary 
Transactions 
(OMT)
Announcement date 9.10.2008 27.3.2008 7.5.2009 8.12.2011 29.9.2008 Quick tender 12.12.2007 7.5.2009 3.11.2011 10.5.2010 6.9.2012
Start date 15.10.2008 28.3.2008 24.6.2009 22.12.2011 30.9.2008 - 17.12.2007 4.6.2009 Nov 2011 May 2010 Conditional
End date/last date 
conducted
Ongoing 12.5.2010 27.10.2011 1.3.2012 Ongoing - Ongoing 30.7.2010 Ongoing 6.9.2012 -
Participants
All banks that 
have access to 
Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
All banks that 
have access 
to Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
All banks that 
have access 
to Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
All banks that 
have access 
to Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
All banks that 
have access 
to Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
All banks that 
have access 
to Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
All banks that 
have access 
to Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
Counter-
parties
Counter-
parties
Counter-
parties
Counter-
parties
Collateral
Collateral 
eligible for 
Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
Collateral 
eligible for 
Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
Collateral 
eligible for 
Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
Collateral 
eligible for 
Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
Collateral 
eligible for 
Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
Collateral 
eligible for 
Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
Collateral 
eligible for 
Eurosystem 
credit 
operations
- - - -
Term of the loan
1 week, 1, 3, 6, 
12, and 36 
months
6M 12M 36M
Same as the 
lenght of 
maintenance 
period
From 
overnight to 5 
days
7, 28, 35 and 
84 days
Purchases in 
primary and 
secondary 
markets
Purchases in 
primary and 
secondary 
markets
Purchases in 
primary and 
secondary 
markets
Purchases in 
secondary 
markets
Objective
Assure the 
provision of 
liquidity to all 
euro area banks
Support 
normalisation 
of the 
functioning of 
euro area 
banking 
system
Encourage the 
provision of 
credit by 
banks to the 
private sector
Encourage the 
provision of 
credit by 
banks to the 
private sector
Improve the 
overall 
liquidity 
position of 
the euro area 
banking 
system
Assure 
orderly 
conditions in 
the euro 
money market
Assure 
liquidity in 
foreign 
currencies to 
euro area 
banks
Restore the 
covered 
bonds market 
segment
Ease funding 
conditions for 
credit 
institutions 
and 
encourage 
lending to the 
private sector
Address the 
malfunctionin
g of securities 
markets and 
restore 
appropriate 
monetary 
policy 
transmission
Safeguarding 
appropriate 
monetary 
policy 
transmission 
and the 
singleness of 
monetary 
policy
Table 1. Unconventional measures taken by the ECB between August 2007 and September 2012. 
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As response to first signs of interbank market stress after August 2007, the ECB started to 
increase the frequency and the liquidity allotted in its long term refinancing operations. 
Moreover, in order to control the excessive volatility of EONIA within maintenance periods, 
the ECB provided a relatively larger volume of funds in the first part of the maintenance 
period so that preferences for early fulfillment of reserve requirements (front-loading) were 
satisfied
15
. Also, the increased volatility in liquidity demand and the larger demand for US 
dollars were offset by fine-tuning operations and through auctions of US dollar liquidity. 
Finally, these measures were also supplemented by an effort to clearly communicate the 
separation between monetary policy decisions and liquidity provision operations (the 
“separation principle”). (Cecioni et al., 2011) 
 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the biggest change in ECB’s 
operational framework was the decision to conduct all refinancing operations with fixed rate 
and full allotment (FRFA) in October 2008, thereby allowing banks to raise unlimited 
liquidity from the ECB. To guarantee full access to refinancing operations and to prevent fire 
sales of assets, which according to Cecioni et al. (2011) would have contributed to further 
deleveraging in bank balance sheets, the ECB also decided to widen the set of assets accepted 
as collateral in its refinancing operations. In addition, US dollar funding strains were 
addressed by providing further liquidity in dollars. Overall, in line with Cecioni et al. (2011) 
suggestions, the purpose of liquidity provision via FRFA policy and supplementary LTROs 
was to restore monetary transmission by preventing spillover effects in the money market and 
encouraging bank lending to private sector (i.e., stimulating the credit channel of monetary 
policy). 
 
In addition to liquidity provision measures described above, the ECB has announced four 
asset purchase programs aimed at reviving selected markets
16
. In May 2009, the ECB started 
its first Covered Bonds Purchase Programme (CBPP), in which it purchased covered bonds 
issued by euro area banks. These bonds have traditionally been major sources of bank funding. 
                                                 
15
 According to ECB website, Eurosystem counterparties must fulfill reserve requirements by holding non-
negative current accounts with the respective national central bank during the reserve maintenance period 
(around one month), in such a way that the daily average of current accounts is at least the amount of the reserve 
requirements. 
 
16
 Asset purchase counterparties include all banks that have access to Eurosystem credit operations and euro area 
based counterparties used by the Eurosystem for the investment of its euro-denominated portfolios. 
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CBPP was ended as planned in June 2009, but re-introduced in November 2011 with a view 
to ease funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises and to encourage lending
17
. 
These programmes were expected to stimulate the credit channel of monetary policy.  
 
In addition to CBPP programmes, the ECB has purchased securities in the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP). Purchases were addressed to relief tensions in certain market segments 
which have weakened monetary policy transmission mechanism. Under SMP, Eurosystem 
central banks could purchase the following: “(a) on the secondary market, eligible marketable 
debt instruments issued by the central governments or public entities of the Member States 
whose currency is the euro; and (b) on the primary and secondary markets, eligible 
marketable debt instruments issued by private entities incorporated in the euro area.”18 The 
SMP program was terminated in 6 September 2012 as the ECB announced a new bond 
purchase program. According to the press release of the new program (OMT), the securities 
purchased under SMP will be held until maturity
19
. 
 
In 6 September 2012, the ECB announced a new (sovereign) bond purchase program (OMT) 
which is addressed to relief tensions in sovereign bond markets. According to the press 
release
18
, the aim of the program is to safeguard an appropriate monetary policy transmission 
and the singleness of the monetary policy. The bond purchases will be known as Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and they will be executed in secondary markets. The 
purchases will focus on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign 
bonds with a maturity of between one and three years. No quantitative limits were set on the 
size of OMTs. The liquidity created through OMTs will be fully sterilized. 
 
The press release reveals that there are two important features of OMTs. The first is that the 
OMT program has a strict conditionality; sovereign states must provide an official help 
request for the EFSF/ESM mechanism if they wish to receive support. The second feature is 
that the Eurosystem is willing to accept the same treatment as private creditors with respect to 
                                                 
 
17
 See: http://www.ecb.int/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html#portfolios 
 
18
 Decision of the European Central Bank to establish a securities markets programme, 14 May 2010. Document 
available at: http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/l_12420100520en00080009.pdf 
 
19
 Available at: http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html 
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bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem. Thus, the ECB will not 
have seniority on bonds purchased under the OMT program. As of 9 October 2012, no 
purchases had been made under the new OMT program as no country had asked for help from 
the EFSF/ESM mechanism. 
 
3.5. Descriptive analysis on the effects of unconventional measures 
 
3.5.1. Outstanding amount of liquidity 
 
In October 2008 the ECB decided to conduct all refinancing operations with fixed rate and 
full allotment (FRFA) which allowed banks to raise unlimited liquidity from the ECB. The 
ECB also decided to widen the set of assets accepted as collateral in these operations. Figure 8 
shows how the outstanding amount of liquidity created through MROs and LTROs has 
evolved from 2002 to the beginning of October 2012. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Outstanding amounts of liquidity allotted in refinancing operations (in billions of 
euro). Data Source: ECB Statistics 
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Figure 8 shows that the adoption of FRFA policy has significantly increased the outstanding 
amount of liquidity allotted in refinancing operations to the banking system. It also seems that 
the adoption of FRFA policy has reduced the use of MROs relative to LTROs as source of 
central bank liquidity. Particularly the two 36 month LTRO operations have substantially 
increased the outstanding amount of liquidity in the market. 
 
3.5.2. Use of ECB’s deposit and marginal lending facilities 
 
In 9 October 2008, the ECB reduced the corridor of standing facilities from 200 basis points 
to 100 basis points around the interest rate on main refinancing operations. The rate of the 
marginal lending facility was reduced from 100 to 50 basis points above the interest rate on 
the main refinancing operation, while the rate of the deposit facility was increased from 100 
to 50 basis points below the interest rate on main refinancing operations. The corridor was 
increased back to 200 basis points in January 2009, but again reduced to 150 basis points in 
May 2009. As of October 2012, the corridor stood at 150 basis points. 
 
As described in section 2.2.2, if interbank markets function smoothly and risks related to 
interbank lending are small, banks should have no incentive to use deposit and marginal 
lending facilities. Figure 9 shows the evolution of deposit and marginal lending facilities set 
up by the ECB from 2007 to the beginning of October 2012. 
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Figure 9. Deposit and lending facilities (in billions of euro). Data source: ECB Statistics 
 
The left hand side of figure 9 reveals that overnight deposits at the ECB were close to zero 
before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. After that, deposits at the ECB have considerably 
increased. In early stages of the crisis, the observation is most likely consistent with risk 
aversion; when perceived creditworthiness of counterparties is low, banks may choose not to 
participate in interbank lending. As a result, it seems that a large part of excess reserves has 
been deposited at the ECB. In later stages of the crisis, overnight deposits have increased 
substantially particularly after the ECB conducted two 36 month LTROs. This observation 
could indicate both risk aversion and a lack of demand for money in the interbank market. By 
conducting two 36 moth LTROs the ECB flooded the interbank market with liquidity with an 
amount that is most likely much more than is demanded by banks to solely fund their 
positions. 
 
The right hand side of figure 9 shows that the use of ECB’s marginal lending facility has been 
quite moderate during the crisis, despite a few spikes in 2009 and 2011. As the marginal 
lending facility charges a penalty rate, it is likely that banks use it only when they cannot 
obtain funding from the interbank market. Liquidity squeeze in interbank market is most 
likely related to risk aversion; when systematic risk is high, banks with excess funds may 
retreat from the market. 
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3.5.3. Inflation expectations 
 
As unconventional operations of the ECB have grown, it is a natural that some market 
participants may become worried about future inflation because there is a well-documented 
long run empirical relationship between broad money (M3) growth and inflation, as already 
mentioned in section 2.4. However, the excess liquidity in the financial system may not 
necessarily produce inflation as banks may choose to hold a significant amount of excess 
reserves in order to protect themselves from future liquidity shortages.
20
 If banks choose not 
to lend out a significant part of the excess liquidity, inflationary pressures may be limited as 
credit creation process is not fully initiated. 
 
According to the ECB (2012), developments in longer term inflation expectations play an 
important role in central banks’ monitoring and assessment activities, because well-anchored 
expectations are central to the functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism. The ECB 
monitors long term inflation expectations derived from surveys and financial market 
instruments. The focus is on longer term rather than shorter-term expectations, because 
inflation in the short term can be heavily affected by shocks, such as commodity price 
developments or changes in indirect taxes. Longer term inflation expectations should be a 
more fundamental measure of expectations about the credibility of monetary policy. 
 
Market-based indicators of longer term inflation expectations are derived from inflation-
linked bonds and inflation-linked swaps. According to the ECB (2012), for the purpose of 
monitoring longer-term inflation expectations, the five-year inflation-linked swap rate five 
years ahead is used as one of the most suitable indicator.
21
 It measures the expected inflation 
for a five-year period starting in five years and is therefore not affected by short-term shocks 
as much as spot five-year inflation swaps are. As a result, five-year forward inflation swap 
rates are more much more stable than five-year spot inflation swap rates. Figure 10 shows 
                                                 
 
20
 The ECB defines M3 to include (1) currency in circulation, (2) overnight deposits, (3) deposits with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years, (4) deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months, (5) repurchase agreements, 
(6) money market fund shares and units and (7) debt securities with a maturity of up to two years. Definition 
available at: http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/aggregates/aggr/html/hist.en.html 
 
21
 In an inflation swap, one party pays a fixed rate on a notional principal amount, while the other party pays a 
floating rate linked to an inflation index, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Just like plain vanilla interest 
rate swaps, the fixed rate in an inflation swap therefore provides information on private sector expectations of 
future inflation. 
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how inflation expectations derived from forward inflation swaps have evolved from 2007 to 
the beginning of October 2012. 
 
 
Figure 10. Eurozone 5y5y inflation expectations. Data source: Bloomberg 
 
Interpretation of figure 10 is that, for example on 30 September, market participants expect 
that the average annual inflation between 30 September 2017 and 30 September 2022 will be 
slightly below 2,4 %, as the last observation in the series indicates.  
 
According to figure 10, long term inflation expectations have been quite well anchored to the 
2 % inflation target during the financial crisis despite worsening economic outlook in Europe. 
It seems that long term inflation expectations did slightly rise after the ECB announced that it 
would conduct two 36 month LTROs in December 2012, but the expectation of future 
inflation seems to be driven mainly by other factors as the effect LTROs disappeared quite 
fast. One potential reason for a surprisingly stable level of inflation expectations after the 36 
month LTROs may be the very nature of liquidity operations. LTROs are simply loans that 
have to be paid back at maturity, which means that their expansionary effect on credit to 
businesses and households may be limited if, for example, there is low demand for money. 
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Also, it is likely that expected increase in banking regulation and higher capital requirements 
are simultaneously offsetting some of the expansionary effects on credit. 
 
3.5.4. Evolution of ECB’s balance sheet 
 
Unconventional monetary policy operations conducted during financial crisis have varied in 
size and it is likely that the significance of each operation in reducing tensions is related to its 
size. As of 9 October 2012, the outstanding amount of asset purchases under the programmes 
were 54 billion euros in CBPP1, 16 billion euros in CBPP2 and 209 billion euros in SMP 
program, according to the ECB open market operations website
22
. As for the LTROs, the 
most important ones seem to have been the two rounds with maturities of 36 months. 
According to the ECB open market operations website, the size of the two rounds that were 
settled 22 December 2011 and 1 May 2012 were 489 billion euros and 530 billion euros, 
respectively. These numbers reveal that the previous asset purchase programmes have been 
relatively small compared to the two 36 month LTROs.  
 
Unconventional asset purchases and LTRO operations have considerably increased the size of 
ECB’s balance sheet. Figure 11 shows how the ECB’s balance sheet has evolved on a weekly 
basis from 1999 to the beginning of October 2012. Biggest movements can be seen in asset 
item 5, which includes, for example, MROs, LTROs and overnight loans from the marginal 
lending facility. The effect of the asset purchase programmes (excluding OMT) that have 
been conducted are included in asset item 7; security holdings of the ECB have grown 
particularly in later phases of the crisis.
23
 Asset purchases made under the two CBPP 
programmes have not been sterilized; therefore, they have increased the amount of liquidity in 
the Eurosystem. However, purchases made under SMP were sterilized so that liquidity 
conditions remained unchanged
24
. Possible bond purchases under the OMT program will also 
be sterilized.  
                                                 
22
 Available at: http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html 
 
 
23
 For a more precise structure of ECB’s balance sheet and for explanations of each item, see Appendix C. 
 
24
 One purpose of fine-tuning operations (included in asset item 5) is to re-absorb the liquidity injected through 
the SMP. 
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Figure 11. Asset side of ECB’s balance sheet from 1999 to 2012 (in billions of euro). Data source: ECB statistics
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4. EMPIRICAL STUDY ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ECB MONETARY POLICY IN 
REDUCING INTERBANK RISK PREMIA 
 
After the start of the financial crisis in 2007, interbank spreads attracted interest in academic 
research as the spreads were recognized to be a good measure of health of the banking system. 
As the crisis was initiated in the U.S., US dollar LIBOR-OIS spreads were the main interest 
of academic studies. EURIBOR-OIS spreads were have been more interesting in later phases 
of the crisis as sovereign credit risk related to troubled European economies spilled over to the 
banking sector. High interbank spreads imply that policy rates are not fully transmitted to 
interbank rates; therefore, the central bank may not succeed in achieving its goals by 
conducting conventional monetary policy, as the first phase of interest rate transmission is 
impaired (see figure 1 and figure 7). 
 
4.1. Overview of previous literature 
 
As a starting point, not all empirical studies have been interested in the effectiveness of 
central bank actions on interbank spreads; some papers have only tried to explain the drivers 
of elevated interbank spreads by decomposing the spread into credit and non-credit related 
components. In addition, most studies have focused on U.S. LIBOR-OIS spreads whereas 
empirical evidence for the euro area is rather scarce. 
 
The first to study the components was the paper by Bank of England (2007). The paper tried 
to decompose the LIBOR-OIS spread into a credit and non-credit component in order to 
assess their relative importance in explaining the funding pressure observed in the interbank 
market. The paper suggested that liquidity risk was more important in the early stage of the 
crisis, which may have been due to liquidity hoarding by banks. 
 
Michaud and Upper (2008) examined the drivers of high LIBOR-OIS spreads in multiple 
currencies. They argued that CDS premia drove Libor-OIS spreads during the second half of 
2007 as they found that the LIBOR-OIS spreads co-moved with measures of credit risk such 
as bank CDS premia. By contrast, they found that the relationship broke down in January 
2008 as LIBOR-OIS spreads declined whereas CDS premia rose. They suggested that the 
somewhat loose relationship after January 2008 was due to liquidity factors taking the more 
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dominant position in driving the spread. Overall, they suggested that both credit and liquidity 
factors were important in driving the spread, but the credit risk was more important to the 
long run behavior of the spread while liquidity factors better explain its day-to-day variations. 
 
Taylor and Williams (2009) studied the effects of the Fed’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) on 
the level of the US dollar LIBOR-OIS spread using the OLS method
25
. They found evidence 
that each of the credit risk proxies (including CDS premia) had positive signs and that they 
were usually significantly different from zero, implying to the importance of credit factors in 
explaining the spread. However, they found no empirical evidence that the TAF had reduced 
spreads as the sums of TAF auction date dummy coefficients were not negative or statistically 
significant. They concluded that because they found no evidence of TAF effects, the LIBOR-
OIS spread must be driven mainly by increased counterparty credit risk between banks. 
 
McAndrews et al. (2008) argued that the model specification in Taylor and Williams (2009) 
was not valid as the level of the spread was used as dependent variable.
 26
 McAndrews et al. 
(2008) argued that a specification with the level of the spread is valid only under the 
assumption that the effect of a TAF auction disappears immediately after the auction. When 
the change, rather than the level, of the LIBOR-OIS spread is used as the dependent variable 
in Taylor and Williams (2009) regression, the coefficient of the TAF dummy becomes 
negative, implying that the TAF was effective in reducing the LIBOR-OIS spread. 
 
As explanatory variables McAndrews et al. (2008) used the lagged level of the spread, the 
daily change of the J.P. Morgan Banking Sector CDS Index and separate TAF announcement 
and operations date dummy variables. Their results showed negative and significant estimates 
for both types of TAF dummies but the level of significance was stronger for the 
announcement dummy variable. By using the change of the spread as dependent variable, the 
results showed that the TAF could be associated with a cumulative reduction of 50 bp in the 
LIBOR-OIS spread. They were also able to boost the R-squared of their regression by adding 
                                                 
25
 The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was a temporary program managed by the United States Federal Reserve 
designed to address elevated pressures in short-term funding markets. Under the program the Fed auctioned 
collateralized loans with terms of 28 and 84 days to depository institutions that were in sound financial condition 
and were expected to remain so over the terms of TAF loans. For further information, see: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm 
 
26
 Taylor and Williams (2009) paper was completed in 2008 before McAndrews et al. (2008) paper, but was not 
published in a journal until 2009. 
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additional variables to their regressions, such as the VIX Index and calendar dummies that 
accounted for market-wide risk aversion and quarter- and year-end effects. 
 
There are also other papers that have tried to decompose the LIBOR-OIS spread and to study 
whether the TAF was effective in bringing down the spread. Overall, the results are more in 
favor of TAF efficiency in reducing the spread, implicitly suggesting that liquidity factors 
have played a key role in driving the spread. According to Abbassi and Linzert (2011), the 
common view acknowledges that both credit and liquidity factors are important.  
 
As the ECB did not make any significant alterations to its operational framework in the pre-
Lehman period, it did not attract the attention of researchers.
27
 The first significant change in 
ECB’s operational framework was the ECB’s decision to conduct refinancing operations with 
fixed rate and full allotment (FRFA policy) in October 2008. Abbassi and Linzert (2011) were 
the first to study how the ECB’s adoption of the FRFA policy affected money market rates. 
They modeled EURIBOR dynamics rather than the EURIBOR-OIS spread.  However, their 
model was closely related to the ones used in LIBOR-OIS studies. The model was also 
expressed in difference form due to non-stationarity of the time series. Abbassi and Linzert 
(2011) were the first the use outstanding amounts of liquidity as explanatory variables instead 
of policy dummy variables that had been used in previous studies. Also, they were the first to 
provide empirical evidence for money market rates in the European context, as prior literature 
had only studied the effect of the ECB’s unconventional policies to macroeconomic and 
financial aggregates. 
 
Overall, the empirical results in Abbassi and Linzert (2011) documented a loss in the 
effectiveness of standard monetary policy during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period: 
they found that policy rate expectations, which were proxied by using OIS rates, were less 
relevant for money market rates up to 12 months after August 2007 when compared to the 
pre-crisis period. The loss in policy effectiveness during the crisis was, according to the 
results, partly compensated by the use of non-standard monetary policy, as the ECB’s net 
increase in outstanding open market operations as of October 2008 accounted for at least a 
                                                 
27
 According to Cecioni et al. (2011), the flexibility of ECB’s operational framework ensured that the ECB was 
able to cope with the pre-Lehman crisis by modifying its framework only marginally. They summarize that 
during this period the ECB made some alterations to its fine-tuning operations, accommodated banks’ desire to 
front-load the reserve requirement, increased the provision of longer term liquidity and offered US dollar 
funding to Eurosystem counterparties. 
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100 basis point decline in EURIBOR rates. The authors revised their earlier work in Abbassi 
and Linzert (2012), which suggested at least an 80 basis point decline in EURIBOR rates. The 
results therefore suggested that the ECB did have effective tools in conducting monetary 
policy in times of crisis. 
 
According to Abbassi and Linzert (2011), almost all previous empirical studies have 
decomposed the spread into a credit and non-credit part in order to assess the relative 
importance of the risk factors. The decomposition has usually been done by using CDS 
premia (a proxy for the credit risk factor) as the only explanatory variable on EURIBOR-OIS 
spread, and then treating the residual as the non-credit component. Abbassi and Linzert (2011) 
argued that this approach is inaccurate because the two components cannot be fully separated 
due to joint variation. If the CDS premia is regressed on the EURIBOR-OIS spread, at least 
one of the coefficients will be biased because the joint variation of credit and liquidity risk is 
allocated to one of the decomposed risk factors. Therefore, the decomposition will not provide 
robust results about the relative importance of the risk factors. Rather, it seems that the 
decomposition is at best directional.
28
 For this reason, the decomposition is not pursued in this 
study. 
 
Michaud and Upper (2008) argued that there are at least two reasons why credit factors may 
correlate with liquidity factors. First, banks may exhibit risk aversion and hoard liquidity in 
times of high systematic risk. This idea is in line with theoretical considerations of Heider et 
al. (2009), who argued that banks may prefer to hoard liquidity instead of lending it out in a 
situation where good banks are driven out of the market and only riskier banks remain present. 
Second, Michaud and Upper (2008) argue that banks may default on their obligations because 
of both liquidity and solvency reasons. Banks may face a situation where they cannot obtain 
market funding even if they are fully solvent. This may occur when all or most lenders retreat 
from the market, possibly because they need liquidity themselves or because of symmetric 
information about the borrower’s creditworthiness. 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Di Socio (2011) explained that if the interbank market was working perfectly, liquidity risk would be zero and 
the spread would represent solely credit risk. In this sense, the residual should represent liquidity risk, but the 
assumption of a perfectly working interbank markets is not realistic. 
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4.2. Data and sample period 
 
The analysis uses daily data collected from Bloomberg and ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
(SDW). Investigated sample period covers the period from 9 August 2007 to 27 September 
2012. The length of the sample period is the most important enhancement to prior literature as 
it covers the effects of 36 month LTROs, which are believed to represent the most effective 
unconventional operations to reduce tensions in the interbank market. 
 
Abbassi and Linzert (2012) divided their sample period (10 March 2004 – 31 December 2009) 
into three parts due to structural breakpoints in the data. By applying Chow breakpoint tests 
they were able to confirm that relevant breakpoints in their sample were 9 August 2007 (start 
of financial crisis in U.S.) and October 15 2008 (adoption of FRFA policy and consequent 
increase in allotted liquidity by the ECB, see figures 8 and 11). Because this study uses a 
longer sample period, a third breakpoint is suspected to be found in December 2011. On 8 
December 2011, the ECB announced that it would conduct two rounds of 36m LTROs at the 
prevailing MRO rate, which at the time of first round of allotment was 1 %. Before December 
2011, the maximum length of LTROs had been 12 months. As the length of these operations 
was three times the length of previous LTROs, they are believed to represent the most 
effective operations in reducing interbank tensions. 
 
In order to confirm suspected breakpoints, Chow (1960) breakpoint test was used to test 
whether coefficients were different between sub-samples and the entire sample. Test results 
are presented in appendix D. Results indeed confirm that there is breakpoint on 8 December 
2011. The first structural break (adoption of FRFA policy in 15 October 2012) found in 
Abbassi and Linzert (2012) was also confirmed. To sum up, investigated time periods are: 
 
1. 9 August 2007 – 14 October 2008 
2. 15 October 2008 – 7 December 2011 
3. 8 December 2011 – 27 September 2012 
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4.3. Variables 
 
Michaud and Upper (2008) argued that in theory, the risk premium in money market rates can 
be broken into variables reflecting both market-wide conditions and characteristics of the 
borrowing bank as follows: 
 
                                             (8) 
 
where       is the term premium (reflecting uncertainty about the path of expected 
overnight rates),       is the credit premium (reflecting the risk of default),      is the 
funding liquidity premium (reflecting funding liquidity risk of the borrowing bank),      is 
the market liquidity premium (reflecting the ease of trading), and       is microstructure of 
the market. Michaud and Upper (2008) noted that disentangling of different components is 
tricky because there are no financial instruments whose payoffs are directly or uniquely 
related to any of the individual factors. Due to data constraints and lack of proper instruments, 
variables       and       are treated as unobserved variables. However, they should 
represent the smallest effects of the above components.  
 
As proxy for credit risk premium (     ), this thesis uses the CDS spread of the Markit 
iTraxx Europe Senior Financials Index, which measures the average CDS premia on 5-year 
debt issued by 25 large European banks. According to BoE (2007), CDS prices (premia) 
reflect the default probability of the reference entity, the loss given default and some 
compensation for uncertainty about these factors. Michaud and Upper (2008) suggested that 
CDS premia are a good measure of credit risk as it much less affected by liquidity conditions 
than the unsecured-secured spreads. Overall, the existing empirical literature has converged to 
the view that bank CDS premia are the best available proxies for counterparty credit risk. De 
Socio (2011) argued that the CDS contracts with 5 year debt as reference are the best choice 
because they are of the most liquid maturity CDS contracts available. As the CDS index rises, 
the EURIBOR-OIS spread is also expected to rise. 
 
Previous studies have often used the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) 
as a measure for general risk aversion in financial markets. It has also been viewed as a proxy 
for market liquidity (    ), which is difficult to observe in the market. In this study, The 
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EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) is used instead of VIX because it should 
better reflect the European context. VSTOXX measures the implied volatility of all EURO 
STOXX 50 Index options regardless of whether the options are in-, out- or at-the-money. 
VSTOXX is designed as a rolling index at a fixed 30 days to expiry. According to Abbassi 
and Linzert (2011), the VIX (and therefore VSTOXX also) may also be related to market 
liquidity premium, because it captures (expected) adverse price changes of market valued 
assets, thereby reflecting, at least indirectly, changes in market liquidity. Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) argued that in an environment of high stress, a potential dry up of funding 
liquidity can cause a fire sale of assets and as a result, market liquidity could dry up too. As 
VSTOXX rises, the EURIBOR-OIS spread is expected also rise (positive coefficient). 
 
Figure 12 shows how CDS and VSTOXX indices have evolved from 2005 to the end of 
September 2012. Both indices were relatively stable before August 2007, but after the start of 
financial crisis they have become more volatile. The iTraxx Europe Senior Financials (5y) 
Index has risen throughout the crisis period, whereas the VSTOXX Index has had occasional 
spikes. 
 
 
Figure 12. History of CDS and VSTOXX indices (as index points). Data source: Bloomberg 
 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
iTraxx Europe Senior Financials 5Y (left axis) VSTOXX (right axis) 
59 
 
According to Michaud and Upper (2008), relevant information for assessing the funding 
liquidity of banks would include liquidity ratios and the size of potential commitments. 
Unfortunately, these variables are not available on a systematic basis and at a relevant 
frequency. Thus, as in Abbassi and Linzert (2011) and De Socio (2011), the spread between 
EUREPO and OIS rates are used as a proxy for funding liquidity risk. EUREPO rates are the 
cost for secured loans between euro area banks. The loans are backed by government bonds 
issued by euro area countries. Much like EURIBOR-OIS spreads reflects the risk premium in 
unsecured lending (incorporating both credit and liquidity risks), the EUREPO-OIS spread 
reflects the risk premium in secured lending, thus incorporating only liquidity risk.
 29
 As a 
result, EUREPO-OIS spread should reflect the liquidity premium charged by the lending 
party. It should mainly reflect funding liquidity risk (    ), but as noted earlier, it may also 
include effects of market liquidity risk (    ). 
 
Figure 13 shows the evolution of 3M EUREPO-OIS spread. The spread was quite stable and 
close to zero before August 2007, after which it increased in volatility and rose substantially. 
At the end of 2009 the spread turned negative, indicating a liquidity discount rather than a 
premium. This possibly reflects a change in lender preferences towards lending in the secured 
market rather than in the unsecured market. As the EUREPO-OIS spread rises, the  
EURIBOR-OIS spread is also expected to rise. 
 
                                                 
29
 In a strict sense, Eurepo rates may not fully risk-free because the collateral provided by the borrower may be 
subject to default. Similarly, OIS rates may not fully risk-free because the interest payment at the end of contract 
period may also be subject to default. However, Eurepo rates represent the only reliable measure of risk-free 
term transactions between banks. Also, the default risk in OIS contracts concerns only the interest payment at the 
end of the contract period, as the the notional amount is not exchanged. Thus, the spread between these two rates 
should reliably reflect only the liquidity premium. 
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Figure 13. 3 month EUREPO-OIS spread. Data source: Bloomberg 
 
According to Baba et al. (2008), an important aspect for many European financial institutions 
was that they faced a shortage of dollar funding as a result of increasing risk aversion by usual 
dollar suppliers. Traditionally U.S. dollar suppliers have included, for example, U.S. based 
banks and money market mutual funds that have investments in Europe. As an enhancement 
to prior literature,  dollar funding pressures are controlled for by using the 1-year cross-
currency basis swap spread.
30
 According to Baba et al. (2008), cross-currency basis swaps 
have traditionally been employed to fund foreign currency investments and as a tool for 
converting currencies of liabilities. The pricing of a cross-currency basis swap indicates the 
premium received/penalty paid to exchange funds in one currency to another. The price of this 
                                                 
30
 For example, De Socio (2011) used the USD LIBOR-OIS spread as explanatory variable for EURIBOR-OIS 
spread in order to account for dollar funding pressures in the European interbank market. This study views that a 
regression using the LIBOR-OIS spread as explanatory variable may not be accurate in controlling dollar 
funding pressures, because the LIBOR-OIS spread only indicates that banks in London are reluctant to lend to 
other London-based banks. This does not necessarily imply that London-based banks are reluctant to lend dollars 
to Eurozone-based banks. Thus, the use of LIBOR-OIS may not be fully accurate because the LIBOR-OIS 
spread could include regional effects. 
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transaction (swap spread) contains information about funding pressures and thus reflects 
funding liquidity premium (    ).31 
 
Figure 14 shows the evolution of 1-year EURUSD cross-currency basis swap spread as basis 
points from 2004 to the end of September 2012. The swap spread has been trading steady at a 
slight premium prior to August 2007, but since then it has turned negative and increased in 
volatility, indicating a that there has been significant dollar funding pressures because banks 
have agreed to swap euros into dollars with a considerable discount (negative premium). The 
observation therefore reflects a surge in demand for dollar term funding relative to that of the 
euro. As the level of EURUSD cross-currency basis swap rises (dollar funding eases), 
EURIBOR-OIS spread is expected to fall. 
 
Figure 14. EURUSD cross-currency basis swap (1y). Data source: Bloomberg 
                                                 
31
 To see this, consider the following example modified from Baba et al. (2008). Suppose that a European bank 
want to swap 100 euros to dollars for three months and that the current EURUSD exchange rate is 1,35. At the 
start of the contract, the European bank borrows 100 *1,35 USD from, and lends 100 EUR to an American bank. 
During the contract term, the European bank receives 3M EURIBOR + α from, and pays USD 3M Libor to the 
American bank, where α is the price of the basis swap agreed upon at the start of the contract. When the contract 
expires, the European bank returns 100·1,35 USD to the American bank, and the American bank returns 100 
EUR to the European bank. The exchange rate does not change during the contract period, making the swap 
pricing immune to movements in the exchange rate (unlike in normal FX swaps). Thus, funds are swapped but 
both still receive interest rates in their initial currencies. As a result, the price of the basis swap (α) turns negative 
if there is a strong demand for dollars and consequently a willingness to receive less in interest rate on euros. 
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Market liquidity premium will, unfortunately, be reflected only indirectly. According to 
Michaud and Upper (2008), an accurate measurement of market liquidity risk would include 
data on transactions between banks, such as number of trades, volume and bid-ask spreads. 
Unfortunately, such data is not available for public use and thus market liquidity risk will only 
be reflected in the VSTOXX Index and in EUREPO-OIS spreads. 
 
To measure the effect of unconventional liquidity provision by the ECB, outstanding amounts 
of OMOs are used to account for relieving effects in the interbank market. OMOs contain 
liquidity provided through both conventional and unconventional operations. It includes the 
liquidity injected through MROs, LTROs, covered bond purchase programmes (CBPP and 
CBPP2) as well as from foreign exchange swap operations. As the SMP is sterilized, it will 
not be included in OMOs. However, the liquidity-absorbing operations that are carried out to 
sterilize the liquidity provided through the SMP are included in OMOs. Figure 15 shows how 
open market operations excluding SMP have affected liquidity conditions in the euro area.  
 
Figure 15. Open market operations (excl. SMP) in billion of euro. Data Source: ECB 
Statistical Data Warehouse 
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Figure 15 shows that the outstanding amount of liquidity increased substantially in October 
2008 when the ECB decided to adopt the FRFA policy. Other significant spikes include the 
two rounds of 36m LTROs late 2011 and early 2012. The length of downward spikes between 
2009 and 2012 is one day and they are caused by end of reserve maintenance periods. In a 
long run examination, it seems that the series could exhibit level-dependent variance and 
occasional trend-like behavior. For these reasons, estimations are carried out by transforming 
OMOs to logarithmic form. 
 
To summarize, each variable with notations, explanations and expected signs are presented in 
table 2. k refers to maturity and t to time. Descriptive statistics on each time series is provided 
in appendix E. 
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NOTATION EXPLANATION REFLECTS SIGN 
    
      Spread between EURIBOR and OIS rates Risk prem.  in interbank lending  
     iTraxx Europe Senior Financials Index Counterparty credit risk + 
               Spread between EUREPO and OIS rates Funding/market liq. risk + 
        Implied volatility of Euro Stoxx 50 Index Market liq. risk + 
           1-year cross-currency basis swap spread Dollar funding liquidity risk - 
          Open market operations (excl. SMP) Outstanding amount of liquidity - 
 
Table 2. Summary of variables 
 
By using multiple maturities (represented by  ) the analysis should also reveal whether ECB 
actions have had maturity-specific effects in the money market. 
 
4.4. Methods 
 
Prior empirical literature has usually employed a regression model in first differences due to 
non-stationary time series. This study should be the first to use a cointegration approach to 
study EURIBOR-OIS spreads. This should be an enhancement to prior literature because 
cointegration allows to estimate long run coefficients in level from, which means that 
information about the level of each time series will not be lost as in difference form 
representation.  
 
4.4.1. Stationarity of time series 
 
The analysis starts with unit root tests in order to verify whether the time series are stationary 
or not. Each time series have to be stationary in order for the OLS to produce unbiased 
estimates. By looking at figures 8, 12, 13, and 14 one can observe that the time series are 
unlikely to be stationary. In order to verify this, unit roots are tested by applying the 
augmented version of the Dickey-Fuller (1979) test for each sub-sample period. Test results 
are presented in appendix F. 
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Overall, t-statistics for level form variables suggest that the variables are non-stationary. By 
transforming the series into first difference form, the issue of non-stationarity disappears, thus 
revealing that the time series are I(1).  This suggests that the model should be expressed in 
differences, unless the time series are cointegrated. If the time series are in fact cointegrated, 
the Error Correction Model (ECM) is an appropriate choice for the model form. Before testing 
for cointegration, some theoretical background is provided to understand the logic behind 
cointegration. 
 
4.4.2. Spurious regressions and cointegration  
 
To understand the logic behind cointegration, the concept of spurious regressions should be 
examined. The following theoretical background is based on Verbeek (2004). 
 
Suppose that two I(0) processes,    and    , are generated by two independent random walks: 
 
                                  
   
                                  
   
 
where     and     are mutually independent. In this setting, there is nothing that should lead to 
a relationship between    and   . However, if we estimate the following regression: 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
According to Verbeek (2004), the results from regression (9) are likely to be characterized by 
a fairly high R
2
 statistic, highly auto-correlated residuals and a significant value for  . This 
phenomenon is a well-known problem of spurious regressions, where two independent non-
stationary variables are spuriously related due to the fact that they are both trended. In this 
case, the OLS estimator does not converge in probability as the sample size increases, the t- 
and F-statistics do not have well-defined asymptotic distributions, and the DW statistic 
converges to zero. The reason is that with    and    being I(1) variables, the error term    will 
also be a non-stationary I(1) variable. 
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According to Verbeek (2004), an important exception to this rule arises when    and    share 
a common stochastic trend. If there is a linear relationship between    and   , a proposition 
states that there must exist some value   such that a linear combination of the variables, 
       ,is I(0), although    and    are both I(1). In such case,    and    are said to be 
cointegrated as they share a common stochastic trend. In a more general case, If two or more 
series are individually integrated but some linear combination of them has a lower order of 
integration, then the series are said to be cointegrated. 
 
According to Verbeek (2004), if    and    are cointegrated, it can be shown that one can 
consistently estimate   from an OLS regression of     on   . In addition, the OLS estimator is 
said to be super consistent, because the OLS estimator converges to   at a much faster rate 
than with conventional asymptotics. If there exist a   such that           is I(0), the   is 
called the cointegrating parameter, or more generally,         is called the cointegrating 
vector.    measures the extent to which the value of    deviates from its long run equilibrium 
value      .    is stationary when    and     have long run components that cancel out to 
produce values for    that systematically differ from zero. 
 
If    and    are cointegrated, the error term    will be I(0). If not,    will be I(1). Hence, the 
cointegrating relationship can be tested by applying a unit root test for   . This can be done 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) test. The test equation is: 
 
                                                     
 
   
                                                              
 
The specification of the lag length   assumes that    is white noise. The null hypothesis states 
that     . Rejection of this hypothesis implies that    is I(0). A failure to reject implies that 
    is stationary, so    is I(1). 
 
In order to test whether the time series used in this study are cointegrated, the cointegrating 
regression is defined as follows: 
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where       represents the EURIBOR-OIS spread with maturity  . The error term    in 
cointegrating regression (11) is estimated and tested for the presence of a unit root by 
applying equation (9) with null hypothesis of     . The test results for are presented in 
appendix F. According to the test results, the variables are cointegrated for each maturity  , 
which means that there exists a long run equilibrium between the variables in equation (11). 
 
4.4.3. Error Correction Model 
 
A good time series model should describe both short run dynamics and the long run 
equilibrium simultaneously. For this purpose the error correction model (ECM) has been 
popularized after the introduction of Engle and Granger (1987) representation theorem. The 
theorem states that if a set of variables are cointegrated, then there exists a valid error-
correction representation of the data. Using the two variable example in section 4.4.2., the 
error-correction representation with           can be written in a simple form as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                               
 
where    is white noise and      is the error term. In the case of cointegration the following 
Engle and Granger two-step procedure can be used: 
 
1. Run the cointegrating regression (9) and save the residuals           
2. Run an ECM regression of     on       and     . 
 
According to Verbeek (2004), the Engle-Granger representation theorem should hold because 
if    and    are both I(1) but have a long run relationship, then there must be some force 
which pulls the equilibrium error back towards zero. To see this, consider a case where 
        and the error correction term       . This means that      is too high above its 
equilibrium value, so in order to restore equilibrium,     must be negative. This intuitively 
means that the error correction coefficient   must be negative such that (11) is dynamically 
stable. In other words, if      is above its equilibrium, then it will start falling in the next 
period so that the equilibrium error will be corrected in the model. 
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Coefficients in equation (12) are interpreted as follows.   in    is called the long run 
parameter and it can be estimated super consistently from cointegrating regression (9), 
whereas   and   are short run coefficients estimated from the error correction model (12). 
Because all variables in the ECM are stationary, the ECM therefore has no spurious 
regression problem. 
 
In time series analysis the explanatory variable may influence the dependent variable with a 
time lag. Furthermore, the dependent variable may be correlated with lags of itself. This often 
raises the need to add lags of both explanatory and dependent variables in the regression. The 
Engle-Granger representation theorem does not specify how many lags of       or       
should be added to the ECM. In practice, the appropriate number of lags is chosen so that 
auto-correlation is removed from the error term. The ECM can be stated in a more general 
form as follows: 
 
                                                       
   
   
         
   
   
                                       
 
where   and   are lag lengths, which in practice are chosen so that autocorrelation is removed 
from   . 
 
4.5. Results of modeling interbank spreads 
 
As stated in the previous section, the cointegrating regression (10) considers the long-run 
balance between variables. Tables 3,4 and 5 show the long run coefficients   for 3, 6 and 12 
month spreads. Overall, test results seem to be quite well in line with expectations. 
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Table 3. Long run dynamics of 3 month EURIBOR-OIS spread. 
                 COEFF. T-VALUE   
COEFF. T-VALUE 
       
                 
 
          
 
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -1.21* -2.49  Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 0.05 0.13 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 1.07** 3.26  Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 2.24** 11.97 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.18 -1.00  Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.83* -2.43 
 
 
 
 
  
 
      
 
             
 
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -0.19** -2.66  Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -1.00** -6.95 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -0.16** -4.45  Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -1.02** -7.53 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.11* -2.57  Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -1.13** -11.60 
 
 
 
 
  
 
           
 
 
  
 
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 45.65* 1.99     
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -23.50** -3.12     
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -32.46** -4.40     
       
Adj. R
2
    No. of observations   
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 0.69   Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 303  
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 0.87   Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 809  
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 0.93   Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 210  
 
Note: t-values are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC). ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1 % and 5 % level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Long run dynamics of 6 month EURIBOR-OIS spread. 
                 COEFF. T-VALUE   
COEFF. T-VALUE 
       
                 
 
          
 
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 0.16 0.42  Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 0.21 0.62 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 0.99** 3.39  Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 2.27** 12.87 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.27 -1.16  Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.77* -2.17 
 
 
 
 
  
 
      
 
             
 
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -0.05 -0.97  Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -1.00** -7.02 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -0.16** -4.71  Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -1.08** -8.69 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.12* -2.12  Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -1.17** -8.78 
 
 
 
 
  
 
           
 
 
  
 
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 37.65 1.58     
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -19.16** -2.62     
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -30.20** -3.72     
       
Adj. R
2
    No. of observations   
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 0.82   Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 303  
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 0.89   Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 809  
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 0.92   Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 210  
 
Note: t-values are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC). ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1 % and 5 % level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Long run dynamics of 12 month EURIBOR-OIS spread. 
                  COEFF. T-VALUE   
COEFF. T-VALUE 
       
                  
 
          
 
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 0.62** 2.85  Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 0.33 1.03 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 0.65** 2.72  Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 2.47** 12.70 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.54 -1.76  Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.70 -1.90 
 
 
 
 
  
 
      
 
             
 
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 0.25** 5.99  Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -1.04** -8.25 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -0.07 -1.84  Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -1.14** -8.92 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.14** -2.08  Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -1.27** -8.03 
 
 
 
 
  
 
           
 
 
  
 
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 26.32 1.10     
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -34.52** -5.06     
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -30.68** -3.52     
       
Adj. R
2
    No. of observations   
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 0.88   Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 303  
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 0.89   Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 809  
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 0.92   Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 210  
 
Note: t-values are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC). ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1 % and 5 % level, respectively. 
 
The EUREPO-OIS spread does not have expected explanatory power between August 2007 
and October 2008, but does indicate statistically and economically important effects between 
October 2008 and December 2011. In the period between December 2011 and September 
2012, the EUREPO-OIS spread does not provide explanatory power. In addition, the relative 
importance of EUREPO-OIS spreads seem to decrease slightly when moving on to longer 
maturities. 
 
Coefficients for CDS Index provide rather mixed results. In most cases, the coefficients for 
CDS Index have negative sign which is the opposite of what was expected. However, the 
effects are not economically important; for example, during October 2008 and December 
2011, the level of CDS Index rose the most from 100 to 267 index points, which accounts for 
a 27 basis point decline in the 3 month and 6 month EURIBOR-OIS spreads (-0.16*(267-
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100)). Although this is against expectations, it should be noted that the coefficients in tables 
3,4 and 5 represent long run equilibriums between EURIBOR-OIS spreads and the CDS 
Index. If counterparty credit risk is not in fact important in driving EURIBOR-OIS spreads, as 
previous literature often suggests, the variables reflecting liquidity conditions should then 
have statistically and economically important effects on EURIBOR-OIS spreads. 
 
As expected, dollar funding liquidity risk seems to be a key driver of EURIBOR-OIS spreads. 
The cross-currency basis swap spread provides statistically and economically important 
effects; for example, between August 2007 and October 2008, the cross-currency basis swap 
spread widened from -2 to -75, which accounts for approximately 73 basis point rise in 3 
month, 6 month and 12 month. Furthermore, tightening of the cross-currency basis swap 
spread accounts for over 50 basis point decline in EURIBOR-OIS spreads between December 
2011 and September 2012. These observations shed light on the importance of dollar funding 
pressures, which has been neglected in prior literature, as key drivers of EURIBOR-OIS 
spreads. 
 
Lastly, the liquidity provided through open market operations has significant effects on 
EURIBOR-OIS spreads after October 2008. Before October 2008, open market operations do 
not provide robust explanatory power, which is similar to the results of Abbassi and Linzert 
(2012). This could be explained by the fact that only after October 2008, the ECB conducted 
open market operations without absorbing the excess liquidity at the end of the reserve 
maintenance period. Between October 2008 and December 2011, however, the outstanding 
amount of liquidity provided by the ECB decreased from 760 billion to 490 billion (-36 %)
32
. 
Between December 2011 and September 2012, liquidity increased from 490 billion to 1040 
billion euros (112 %). Table 6 presents the effects of OMOs as well as the change in each 
maturity spread during investigated time periods. Effect of OMOs is calculated as follows: 
               .  
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the ECB conducted US dollar liquidity-providing operations,  
supplementary LTROs and announced that it would adopt the FRFA policy starting in 15 October 2012. 
Furthermore, in 8 October 2012, the ECB lowered its key rates by 50 basis points, all of which led to a 
significant increase of liquidity in the market just before 15 October 2012. Thus, the level of liquidity was very 
high in 15 October 2012, which is the start date of the second time period investigated. 
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 3 month spread 6 month spread 12 month spread 
Effect of OMOs    
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 8.5 bp 6.9 bp 12.4 bp 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -36.4 bp -33.8 bp -34.4 bp 
    
Changes in spreads    
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -70.3 bp -65.9 bp -54.8 bp 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -86.6 bp -90.6 bp -98.6 bp 
 
Table 6. Effect of OMOs after the adoption of FRFA policy. 
 
Table 6 shows that between October 2008 and December 2011, a 36 % reduction in 
outstanding amount of liquidity accounts for 8.5, 6.9 and 12.4 rise in EURIBOR-OIS spreads. 
Similarly, between December 2011 and September 2012, a 112 % increase in outstanding 
amount of liquidity accounts for a 36.4, 33.8 and 34.4 decline in EURIBOR-OIS spreads. 
When this is compared to the changes in each spread during the same time period, the 
estimation results show that between December 2011 and September 2012, the increase in 
OMOs accounts for over one-thirds of the decline in EURIBOR-OIS spreads. Thus, the 
results suggest that the Eurosystem’s net increase in the outstanding amounts of liquidity has 
significantly reduced the risk premium in interbank lending. 
 
Moreover, results from estimating the ECM in equation (13) provides further information 
whether EURIBOR-OIS spreads adjust or not to correct for the equilibrium error. The results 
from estimating equation (13) are provided in table 7. The appropriate number of lags in 
equation (13),   and  , are chosen so that autocorrelation is removed from the error term   .  
 
 3 month spread 6 month spread 12 month spread 
Speed of adjustment    
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -0.04* -0.04** -0.04** 
 
Note: t-values are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC). ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1 % and 5 % level, respectively. 
 
Table 7. Speed of adjustment parameters for EURIBOR-OIS spreads. 
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In most cases, autocorrelation was removed from    with      . For those cases where 
autocorrelation was still present, it was removed by raising    . However, 
heteroskedasticity was present in each of the nine regression. Thus, HAC t-values were used 
to correctly assess the statistical significance of the speed of adjustment coefficients. 
 
In most cases, the speed of adjustment coefficients ( ) have a negative sign as expected and 
their absolute values are quite small, which indicates slow adjustment. However, their 
statistical significance is verified only in three out of nine cases, between December 2011 and 
September 2012. During this time period, the results show that EURIBOR-OIS spreads adjust 
to correct for the equilibrium error. In addition to EURIBOR-OIS spreads adjusting, there 
could be other variables which also adjust. However, they are not recognized in the analysis. 
 
In each of the other six cases, some combination of the    variables have to adjust to correct 
for the equilibrium error. In each of these six cases, at least one    differed significantly from 
zero (not reported), which provides evidence of cointegration but not about which of the    
variables adjust to correct for the equilibrium error
 33
.  
 
4.6. Potential problems in empirical analysis 
 
Such as previous studies, the empirical analysis potentially suffers from a number of 
limitations. The first problem in the empirical part of the thesis has to do with the lack of 
proper variables. Prior academic literature has done a good job at identifying the most 
important theoretical factors driving the tensions in interbank markets. Unfortunately, these 
factors are often difficult or impossible to measure. For this reason, studies have had to rely 
on proxies that are not fully reliable. Firstly, in the case of some proxies, prior literature has 
recognized that they may not solely reflect the desired factor, but could also include effects 
from other factors. Thus, the coefficients need to be interpreted cautiously. Secondly, the 
study could to suffer from the omitted variable bias, because some variables are simply 
impossible to measure or because desired data is not available at relevant frequency. 
                                                 
33 
According to Enders (1995), a necessary condition for cointegration to exist is that   and    in equation (13) 
cannot simultaneously be equal to zero. If both coefficients equal zero, then it could be said that the     
sequence does not Granger cause     sequence. However, if one or both coefficients significantly differ from 
zero, then the variables are cointegrated. 
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The econometric methods used in this study may also be subject to criticism. In time series 
analysis, the concept of cointegration is well recognized and widely used particularly after 
pioneering work by Engle and Granger (1987). However, cointegration among variables as 
such does not provide information about causality nor about the number of cointegrating 
relations when there are more than two variables. When there are more than two explanatory 
variables, there could be more than one cointegrating relations among them, which cannot be 
identified using the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure. As there are six time series 
investigated in this study, it may be that there are up to five cointegrating vectors among the 
variables. Without having information about the number of cointegrating vectors, the analysis 
is not able to econometrically prove that causality runs as it is specified in equation (13). Thus, 
causality in equation (13) is based on theoretical considerations of prior literature reviewed in 
section 4.1. 
 
Moreover, the Engle Granger (1987) analysis is based on the assumption that that the 
variables in equation (13) are exogenous. According to Enders (1995), the long run 
coefficients in tables 3,4 and 5 do not have asymptotic t-distributions unless the variables in 
equation (13) are actually independent and there exist only one cointegrating vector. 
Appendix H presents simple correlation matrices, which do not point to any systematically 
high correlations between variables. However, a simple correlation analysis does not provide 
a reliable assessment about the exogeneity of variables. 
 
Furthermore, the Engle Granger (1987) analysis cannot reveal which of the set of cointegrated 
variables adjust to correct for the equilibrium error. Although this not in the scope of this 
study, an analysis of the full system of equations should be able to recognize which variables 
adjust to the long-run cointegration relation. According to Enders (1995), a Vector 
Autoregressive process (VAR) would be an appropriate description of this system. In a VAR, 
each variable is “explained” by its own lagged values, and the lagged values of all other 
variables in the system. It treats variables as endogenous and could provide more information 
about the direction of causality without making assumptions. Overall, a VAR system and the 
use of Johansen (1988) procedure, which is able to detect the existence of multiple 
cointegrating vectors, would be an enhancement to the analysis. 
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5. IMLICATIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY TO THE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE INTEREST RATE CHANNEL 
 
5.1. Interbank market 
 
After the adoption of the FRFA policy in October 2008, outstanding amount of liquidity 
allotted through OMOs increased significantly and EURIBOR-OIS spreads started to fall, 
continuing their downward trend throughout 2009, 2010 and the first half of 2011. In the 
second half of 2011, the spreads started to rise again. The ECB responded by conducting new 
unconventional measures, of which the 36 month LTROs were the most important. After late 
2011, the spreads have been steadily declining throughout 2012. Prior empirical evidence 
presented in section 4.1 has suggested that reductions in interbank market tensions have been 
affected by unconventional actions conducted by central banks. Keeping in mind the potential 
problems with the empirical analysis, this study also provided empirical support to the 
effectiveness of the ECB actions in reducing interbank market tensions. 
 
It is clear that low levels of EURIBOR-OIS spreads are highly desirable. When the spreads 
are low, money market rates follow the expected path of overnight rates, which of course is a 
necessary condition for conducting effective monetary policy through the policy rate. When 
interbank spreads are low, future changes in the ECB policy rate should be fully transmitted 
to interbank rates, thereby lowering wholesale funding costs. Lower funding costs should then 
be transmitted to lending rates. If this has occurred, then the unconventional measures of the 
ECB have potentially helped to restore the proper functioning of the first phase of the interest 
rate channel. However, a proper assessment of whether the functioning of the interest rate 
channel has been restored requires some analysis about developments in the retail market, 
which ultimately transmits monetary policy to the real economy.  
 
5.2. Retail market 
 
As banks should have no inventive to lend money at the retail market at cost that is lower than 
the prevailing funding cost, high levels of EURIBOR-OIS spreads thus imply that changes in 
the ECB policy rate are not fully transmitted to money market rates nor retail rates. However, 
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the determination of retail rates is not solely explained by the funding cost (EURIBOR rates), 
because there are other factors which may reduce retail lending. These other factors could 
include, for example, increased banking regulation, higher capital requirements and increased 
bank taxation. Thus, the strength of pass through can significantly differ between the two 
steps of interest rate pass through. 
 
To examine the pass through from money market rates to retail rates, some descriptive 
analysis is provided about euro area retail rates. According to the ECB website, MFI interest 
rate statistics cover those interest rates that resident monetary financial institutions (MFIs, i.e. 
"credit institutions") apply to euro-denominated loans granted to households and non-
financial corporations which are residents of the euro area. These statistics can be used for the 
analysis of monetary developments and the monetary transmission mechanism as well as for 
the monitoring of financial stability. 
 
Figure 16 shows selected interest rates spreads against the 12 month EURIBOR for new loans 
on a monthly basis.
34
 The period considered spans from January 2006 to October 2012 and 
the geographic area taken into account is the Euro area (changing composition). All retail 
rates used to calculate the spread against 12 month EURIBOR are annualized agreed rates, 
which the ECB has defined as “the interest rate that is individually agreed between the 
reporting agent and the household or non-financial corporation for a deposit or loan, 
converted to an annual basis and quoted in percentages per annum”. 35 Original maturities are 
used to calculate the average interest rate for each of the selected series. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Selected interest rates for households and non-profit institutions serving households include: Loans for 
consumption (excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt, and lending 
for house purchase (excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt). 
Interest rates for non-financial firms include: loans other than revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and 
extended credit card debt, with amounts up to and including EUR 1 million and over EUR 1 million. 
 
35
 Manual on MFI interest rate statistics is available at: http://www.ecb.int/stats/pdf/money/mfi-
intrestratestatisticsmanual.pdf?ecf300083643da72431de53429e7cc68 
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Figure 16. Retail rate spreads against the 12 month EURIBOR. Data Source: ECB Statistical 
Data Warehouse. 
 
According to figure 16, spreads between money market rates and retail rates had been 
declining in the pre-Lehman period, suggesting strengthening interest rate pass through. 
However, in late 2008 the spreads rose to significantly higher levels, which suggests a 
significantly weakened interest rate pass through. After this, pass through improved for 
households whereas pass through for firms maintained weak. 
 
An interesting feature in both charts is that the interest rate pass through started to weaken 
again in late 2011 and has kept weakening throughout 2012. This occurs despite the several 
unconventional measures by the ECB, which raised the outstanding amount of liquidity in the 
banking system to a record high level (see figure 15). Based on these observations, it seems 
that interest rate pass through is driven by other factors and not at all affected by liquidity 
conditions in the banking system. If this was the case, then the unconventional actions of the 
ECB have not been able to improve interest rate pass through from money market rates to 
retail rates, which sets future challenges to conducting effective monetary policy through the 
policy rate. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Traditional monetary policy relies on the interest rate channel of monetary transmission, in 
which the central bank sets the policy rate and expects that the policy rate passes through to 
money market rates and bank retail rates, which ultimately affect savings, consumption, 
investment, aggregate demand and prices. Strong interest rate pass through is particularly 
important for central banks which have an inflation target, such as the ECB. As a response to 
the financial crisis and consequent recession, the ECB lowered its policy rate close to the zero 
lower bound. As this was not enough, the ECB had to rely on several unconventional policies 
to restore market confidence and to stimulate the economy. Unconventional measures were 
expected to work through alternative channels, such as the exchange rate-, asset price- and 
credit channels of monetary policy. If unconventional policies have worked as expected, then 
the alternative channels could have been valuable in restoring the functioning of the interest 
rate channel, and thus providing the basis for effective monetary policy in the future. 
 
During the financial crisis, the ECB took over the dysfunctioning interbank market by 
replacing much of the interbank activity with its FRFA policy and supplementary LTROs. 
Unconventional operations led to a significant increase in outstanding amounts of liquidity in 
the banking system. This thesis paid particular interest to the question of whether the liquidity 
created through unconventional monetary policies was effective in lowering the risk premium 
in interbank lending, and thus potentially improving interest rate transmission from the ECB 
policy rate to EURIBOR rates. The empirical part of this thesis added to the very scarce 
literature providing evidence about the efficiency of unconventional policies.  
 
The empirical results provide support for the effectiveness of the ECB’s liquidity provision in 
affecting interbank spreads.  Between October 2008 and December 2011, a 36 % reduction in 
outstanding amount of liquidity is associated with a 8.5, 6.9 and 12.4 rise in EURIBOR-OIS 
spreads. Similarly, between December 2011 and September 2012, a 112 % increase in 
outstanding amount of liquidity is associated with a 36.4, 33.8 and 34.4 decline in EURIBOR-
OIS spreads. Keeping in mind the potential problems with the analysis, the results suggest 
that the Eurosystem’s net increase in the outstanding amounts of liquidity has significantly 
reduced the risk premium in interbank lending, and thus improved the interest rate 
transmission from the ECB policy rate to EURIBOR rates. 
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An improved interest rate transmission from the ECB policy rate to EURIBOR rates does not, 
however, necessarily imply that the transmission from EURIBOR rates to bank retail rates is 
also improved. Naturally, there are multiple additional factors affecting the determination of 
bank retail rates in addition to interbank rates. Still, everything else equal, a reduction in 
interbank rates should result in lower retail rates, which in turn should have expansionary 
effects on the real economy. In this sense, unconventional measures have not only lowered the 
risk premium in interbank lending, but also retail rates. However, if the examination is 
restricted to only account for the second phase of transmission, it seems that interest rate pass 
through is driven by other factors and not at all affected by liquidity conditions in the banking 
system. This implies that the functioning of the interest rate channel has improved only 
through lower interbank rates. Thus, the effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy during 
the crisis depends on which viewpoint is taken. Overall, the functioning of the interest rate 
channel has not been adequately restored so that the effectiveness of future monetary policy 
through the policy rate would be guaranteed. 
 
As a future prospect, restoring proper functioning of the interest rate channel would require 
addressing those factors that drive the evolution of retail rates. The bank lending channel is an 
important factor in this respect, as unconventional policies by the ECB have increased excess 
reserves in the banking system, which should lead to a higher quantity of bank loans available. 
However, based on future inflation expectations and current output, it does not seem that the 
excess liquidity in the banking system has significantly accelerated the velocity of money. 
Velocity might have increased after July 2012, when the ECB lowered its overnight deposit 
rate to zero, thereby shifting incentives towards increased lending instead of overnight 
deposits at the ECB. So far, it is too early to say whether this will stimulate the bank lending 
channel. However, if the uncertain economic environment in Europe should significantly 
improve and the ECB adjusts its policy rates slowly, the excess liquidity in the banking 
system has the potential to cause an unsustainable credit expansion. Although a this would 
require multiple favorable developments in the economy, the importance of right timing  in 
raising interest rates has grown in preventing future risks from realizing. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. History of EURIBOR and EUREPO rates. 
 
 
 
Data source: Bloomberg 
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Appendix B. History of EURIBOR-OIS spreads 
 
 
Data source: Bloomberg 
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Appendix C. Complete structure of ECB’s balance sheet 
 
  Assets (EURm) 
 
  Liabilities (EURm) 
1 Gold and gold receivables 
 
1 Banknotes in circulation 
2 
Claims on non-euro area residents 
denominated in foreign currency  
2 
Liabilities to euro area credit institutions 
related to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro 
2.1. Receivables from the IMF 
 
2.1. 
Current accounts (covering the minimum 
reserve system) 
2.2. 
Balances with banks and security 
investments, external loans and other 
external assets 
 
2.2. Deposit facility 
3 
Claims on euro area residents denominated 
in foreign currency  
2.3. Fixed-term deposits 
4 
Claims on non-euro area residents 
denominated in euro  
2.4. Fine-tuning reverse operations 
4.1. 
Balances with banks, security investments 
and loans  
2.5. Deposits related to margin calls 
4.2. 
Claims arising from the credit facility under 
ERM II  
3 
Other liabilities to euro area credit 
institutions denominated in euro 
5 
Lending to euro area credit institutions 
related to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro 
 
4 Debt certificates issued 
5.1. Main refinancing operations 
 
5 
Liabilities to other euro area residents 
denominated in euro 
5.2. Longer-term refinancing operations 
 
5.1. General government 
5.3. Fine-tuning reverse operations 
 
5.2. Other liabilities 
5.4. Structural reverse operations 
 
6 
Liabilities to non-euro area residents 
denominated in euro 
5.5. Marginal lending facility 
 
7 
Liabilities to euro area residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
5.6. Credits related to margin calls 
 
8 
Liabilities to non-euro area residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
6 
Other claims on euro area credit institutions 
denominated in euro  
8.1. Deposits, balances and other liabilities 
7 
Securities of euro area residents 
denominated in euro  
8.2. 
Liabilities arising from the credit facility 
under ERM II 
7.1. 
Securities held for monetary policy 
purposes  
9 
Counterpart of special drawing rights 
allocated by the IMF 
7.2. Other securities 
 
10 Other liabilities 
8 
General government debt denominated in 
euro  
11 Revaluation accounts 
9 Other assets 
 
12 Capital and reserves 
 
Source: User guide on the consolidated weekly financial statement of the Eurosystem. 
Includes a detailed explanation of each item. Available at: 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/html/wfs-userguide.en.html 
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Appendix D. Chow breakpoint tests 
 
Chow breakpoint tests are applied to the following test equation. The test equation is the same 
as equation (11): 
 
                                                       
                                                                                                                  
 
The chow breakpoint test uses the above equation to obtain the sum of squared residuals for 
restricted and unrestricted models, which are then compared by the F-statistic. If the sum of 
squared residuals is different between a sub-sample and the entire sample, the test indicates 
that there has been a structural change. The null hypothesis states that coefficients from the 
sub-sample and the entire sample are simultaneously equal (no structural change), or that 
sums of squared residuals are the same between sub-sample and the entire sample.  
 
The first breakpoint (P1) is set to 15 October 2008 (adoption of FRFA policy) and the second 
breakpoint (P2) to 8 December 2011 (announcement of 36m LTROs). The table below shows 
the F-statistic for group of interaction variables: 
 
 
 k=3M  k=6M  k=12M 
         
 P1 P2  P1 P2  P1 P2 
F-statistic 337.58 112.22  270.61 129.10  230.88 161.86 
[t-prob.] [0.0000]** [0.0000]**  [0.0000]** [0.0000]**  [0.0000]** [0.0000]** 
 
 
Results support the existence of breakpoints in 15 October 2008 and 8 December 2011. Thus, 
the sample period can be divided into three parts.  
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Appendix E. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 VARIABLE UNIT MIN MAX AVERAGE STDEV 
      
EURIBOR-OIS_3M basis points 13,6 206,9 54,9 33,3 
EURIBOR-OIS_6M basis points 18,0 222,5 72,9 34,5 
EURIBOR-OIS_12M basis points 22,8 239,0 88,3 39,7 
      
EUREPO-OIS_3M basis points -28,1 22,6 -3,5 8,0 
EUREPO-OIS_6M basis points -22,6 18,4 -2,6 7,5 
EUREPO-OIS_12M basis points -27,2 27,7 -2,2 7,8 
      
VSTOXX index points 17,2 87,5 29,6 10,0 
CDS index points 20,4 355,3 142,7 71,2 
XCCY_SWAP basis points -132,5 1,9 -36,0 21,8 
 
 
    
OMOs bln. euros 180 1119 632 198 
 
 
The above table provides descriptive statistics about variables from August 2007 to 
September 2012. Maximum values for EURIBOR-OIS, EUREPO-OIS, and VSTOXX were 
reached in October 2008. CDS index was at its highest in November 2011, and 
XCCY_SWAP was at its lowest in October 2008. OMOs peaked after the two rounds of 36m 
LTROs in June 2012. 
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Appendix F. Unit root tests 
 
The ADF test applies the following AR(p) process with a constant for each time series in both 
level and first difference form: 
 
                
 
   
          
 
where   is constant (drift),   is the lag,   is the coefficient to which the t-statistic is provided, 
and    is the coefficient for lagged first differences. The null hypothesis states that    = 0, or 
that the series is non-stationary. The test compares the t-statistic for   with critical values. If 
the t-statistic for   is smaller (more negative) than critical values, H0 is rejected and the 
conclusion is that the series is stationary. By using five lags (   ), the preferred model was 
chosen based on the smallest AIC value.  
  
5 % critical value is -2.87 (*) 
1 % critical value: -3.45 (**) 
 
August 2007 – October 2008: 
 
LEVELS T-ADF    DIFFERENCES T-ADF   
       
                 -2.211 2                    -7.271** 1 
                 -0.8871 3                    -6.958** 2 
                  0.06886 3                     -8.455** 2 
       
                -1.695 5                   -11.53** 5 
                -1.625 5                   -11.86** 5 
                 -2.812 5                    -13.10** 4 
       
        -0.1373 3           -10.61** 2 
     -2.160 1        -15.21** 0 
           2.918 5              -11.80** 4 
          -2.388 5             -13.29** 4 
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October 2008 – December 2011: 
LEVELS T-ADF    DIFFERENCES T-ADF   
       
                 -3.111* 3                    -14.78** 3 
                 -2.803 3                    -17.91** 2 
                  -2.249 3                     -18.26** 2 
       
                -0.4688 5                   -18.32** 5 
                -1.478 5                   -19.25** 5 
                 -2.345 5                    -19.32** 5 
       
        -3.077* 5           -15.95** 4 
     -0.9642 4        -18.22** 2 
           -3.127* 5              -14.91** 5 
          -2.084 5             -17.09** 5 
 
Note: By adding more than 5 lags to the test equation, the ADF test indicates that                 , 
        and,            are all non-stationary. This is because the initial number of 5 lags was not enough 
to remove autocorrelation from these series. Thus, these series can reliably be treated as non-stationary. 
 
 
December 2011 – September 2012: 
LEVELS T-ADF    DIFFERENCES T-ADF   
       
                 -1.904 5                    -5.131** 4 
                 -1.172 5                    -4.635** 5 
                  -0.5814 2                     -8.041** 3 
       
                -0.6605 3                   -10.25** 3 
                -0.5255 4                   -10.34** 3 
                 -0.9325 4                    -10.50** 3 
       
        -3.266* 0           -9.943** 2 
     -1.692 0        -14.12** 0 
           -0.5335 4              -9.045** 3 
          -2.294 3             -11.47** 2 
 
Note: the ADF test was not able to reject the stationarity of         at 5 % significance level. However, 
stationarity is rejected at 1 % significance level. Also, by adding a trend to the test equation the stationarity at 5 % 
significance level disappears. Thus, the variable can be treated as non-stationary and it should not cause biased 
estimates. 
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Appendix G. Cointegration tests  
 
The following tables present unit root test results for    in equation (10). Null hypothesis is 
that      . 
 
                                                     
 
   
                                                              
 
Lag length was chosen to be three      , from which the appropriate number of lags was 
chosen based on AIC information criteria. 
 
 
3 MONTH SPREAD T-STATISTIC (ADF)   
   
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -3.669** 3 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -8.280** 0 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -4.378** 2 
 
 
6 MONTH SPREAD T-STATISTIC (ADF)   
   
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -4.168** 3 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -8.415** 0 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -3.847** 2 
 
 
12 MONTH SPREAD T-STATISTIC (ADF)   
   
Aug 2007 – Oct 2008 -3.986** 3 
Oct 2008 – Dec 2011 -7.078** 3 
Dec 2011 – Sep 2012 -3.568** 2 
 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 % and 5 % level, respectively. 
 
 
The null hypothesis of      is rejected in each case, implying that there is a cointegrating 
relationship between the variables.  
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Appendix H. Correlation matrices  
 
9 August 2007 – 14 October 2008: 
k=3M 
EURIBOR-
OIS_3M 
EUREPO-
OIS_3M 
VSTOXX CDS 
XCCY_SWA
P 
Ln_OMOs 
EURIBOR-
OIS_3M 
 0.41681 0.48312 0.16636 -0.77164 0.54661 
EUREPO-
OIS_3M 
0.41681  0.45048 0.41659 -0.69800 0.32024 
VSTOXX 0.48312 0.45048  0.53485 -0.64883 0.51121 
CDS 0.16636 0.41659 0.53485  -0.48704 0.22246 
XCCY_SWAP -0.77164 -0.69800 -0.64883 -0.48704  -0.52872 
Ln_OMOs 0.54661 0.32024 0.51121 0.22246 -0.52872  
 
k=6M 
EURIBOR-
OIS_6M 
EUREPO-
OIS_6M 
VSTOXX CDS 
XCCY_SWA
P 
Ln_OMOs 
EURIBOR-
OIS_6M 
 0.58553 0.62626 0.40459 -0.89939 0.57106 
EUREPO-
OIS_6M 
0.58553  0.42317 0.36475 -0.64731 0.27184 
VSTOXX 0.62626 0.42317  0.53485 -0.64883 0.51121 
CDS 0.40459 0.36475 0.53485  -0.48704 0.22246 
XCCY_SWAP -0.89939 -0.64731 -0.64883 -0.48704  -0.52872 
Ln_OMOs 0.57106 0.27184 0.51121 0.22246 -0.52872  
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k=12M 
EURIBOR-
OIS_12M 
EUREPO-
OIS_12M 
VSTOXX CDS 
XCCY_SWA
P 
Ln_OMOs 
EURIBOR-
OIS_12M 
 0.54750 0.69000 0.63174 -0.90817 0.52091 
EUREPO-
OIS_12M 
0.54750  0.31643 0.29172 -0.52296 0.16822 
VSTOXX 0.69000 0.31643  0.53485 -0.64883 0.51121 
CDS 0.63174 0.29172 0.53485  -0.48704 0.22246 
XCCY_SWAP -0.90817 -0.52296 -0.64883 -0.48704  -0.52872 
Ln_OMOs 0.52091 0.16822 0.51121 0.22246 -0.52872  
 
 
15 October 2008 – 7 December 2011: 
 
k=3M 
EURIBOR-
OIS_3M 
EUREPO-
OIS_3M 
VSTOXX CDS 
XCCY_SWA
P 
Ln_OMOs 
EURIBOR-
OIS_3M 
 0.18567 0.89814 0.21276 -0.70268 0.27331 
EUREPO-
OIS_3M 
0.18567  0.15594 -0.66061 0.36712 0.51762 
VSTOXX 0.89814 0.15594  0.28817 -0.66418 0.30375 
CDS 0.21276 -0.66061 0.28817  -0.61721 -0.51746 
XCCY_SWAP -0.70268 0.36712 -0.66418 -0.61721  -0.025641 
Ln_OMOs 0.27331 0.51762 0.30375 -0.51746 -0.025641  
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k=6M 
EURIBOR-
OIS_6M 
EUREPO-
OIS_6M 
VSTOXX CDS 
XCCY_SWA
P 
Ln_OMOs 
EURIBOR-
OIS_6M 
 0.24679 0.90739 0.23455 -0.73085 0.28806 
EUREPO-
OIS_6M 
0.24679  0.25165 -0.61233 0.27863 0.57306 
VSTOXX 0.90739 0.25165  0.28817 -0.66418 0.30375 
CDS 0.23455 -0.61233 0.28817  -0.61721 -0.51746 
XCCY_SWAP -0.73085 0.27863 -0.66418 -0.61721  -0.025641 
Ln_OMOs 0.28806 0.57306 0.30375 -0.51746 -0.025641  
 
k=12M 
EURIBOR-
OIS_12M 
EUREPO-
OIS_12M 
VSTOXX CDS 
XCCY_SWA
P 
Ln_OMOs 
EURIBOR-
OIS_12M 
 0.091536 0.88665 0.42556 -0.80151 0.11003 
EUREPO-
OIS_12M 
0.091536  0.26376 -0.58479 0.24131 0.58631 
VSTOXX 0.88665 0.26376  0.28817 -0.66418 0.30375 
CDS 0.42556 -0.58479 0.28817  -0.61721 -0.51746 
XCCY_SWAP -0.80151 0.24131 -0.66418 -0.61721  -0.025641 
Ln_OMOs 0.11003 0.58631 0.30375 -0.51746 -0.025641  
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8 December 2011 – 27 September 2012: 
 
k=3M 
EURIBOR-
OIS_3M 
EUREPO-
OIS_3M 
VSTOXX CDS 
XCCY_SWA
P 
Ln_OMOs 
EURIBOR-
OIS_3M 
 -0.78872 0.37098 0.22863 -0.87935 -0.86067 
EUREPO-
OIS_3M 
-0.78872  -0.39209 -0.10394 0.74425 0.66263 
VSTOXX 0.37098 -0.39209  0.78097 -0.64816 -0.32092 
CDS 0.22863 -0.10394 0.78097  -0.58262 -0.10683 
XCCY_SWAP -0.87935 0.74425 -0.64816 -0.58262  0.70216 
Ln_OMOs -0.86067 0.66263 -0.32092 -0.10683 0.70216  
 
k=6M 
EURIBOR-
OIS_6M 
EUREPO-
OIS_6M 
VSTOXX CDS 
XCCY_SWA
P 
Ln_OMOs 
EURIBOR-
OIS_6M 
 -0.72730 0.37650 0.23198 -0.87974 -0.84711 
EUREPO-
OIS_6M 
-0.72730  -0.27249 0.021945 0.64579 0.58384 
VSTOXX 0.37650 -0.27249  0.78097 -0.64816 -0.32092 
CDS 0.23198 0.021945 0.78097  -0.58262 -0.10683 
XCCY_SWAP -0.87974 0.64579 -0.64816 -0.58262  0.70216 
Ln_OMOs -0.84711 0.58384 -0.32092 -0.10683 0.70216  
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k=12M 
EURIBOR-
OIS_12M 
EUREPO-
OIS_12M 
VSTOXX CDS 
XCCY_SWA
P 
Ln_OMOs 
EURIBOR-
OIS_12M 
 -0.66741 0.37741 0.22089 -0.87648 -0.84024 
EUREPO-
OIS_12M 
-0.66741  -0.15237 0.15045 0.52234 0.51907 
VSTOXX 0.37741 -0.15237  0.78097 -0.64816 -0.32092 
CDS 0.22089 0.15045 0.78097  -0.58262 -0.10683 
XCCY_SWAP -0.87648 0.52234 -0.64816 -0.58262  0.70216 
Ln_OMOs -0.84024 0.51907 -0.32092 -0.10683 0.70216  
 
